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THE CORPORATE MONITOR:
THE NEW CORPORATE CZAR?t
Vikramaditya Khanna *
Timothy L. Dickinson**
Following the recent spate of corporate scandals, government enforcement
authorities have increasingly relied upon corporate monitors to help en-
sure law compliance and reduce the number of future violations. These
monitors also permit enforcement authorities, such as the Securities & Ex-
change Commission and others, to leverage their enforcement resources in
overseeing corporate behavior. However there are few descriptive or nor-
mative analyses of the role and scope of corporate monitors. This paper
provides such an analysis. After sketching out the historical development
of corporate monitors, the paper examines the most common features of
the current set of monitor appointments supplemented by interviews with
monitors. This is followed by a normative analysis that examines when it is
desirable to appoint monitors and what powers and obligations they
should have. Based on this analysis, we provide a number of recommenda-
tions for enhancing the potential of corporate monitors to serve a useful
deterrent and law enforcement function without being unduly burdensome
on corporations. This involves, among other things, discussion of the kinds
of powers monitors should have and the fiduciary duties monitors should
owe to the shareholders whose businesses they are monitoring.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODUCTION .................................................................................... 17 14
I. FROM M ASTER TO M ONITOR .................................................. 1715
A. Historical Underpinnings ................................................ 1715
B. RICO and Beyond ............................................................ 1716
C. Prudential and DOJ Memoranda .................................... 1717
II. THE PROCESS OF APPOINTING CORPORATE MONITORS
AND THEIR POW ERS ............................................................... 1720
f © 2007 By Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Email: vskhanna@umich.edu or
vskhanna2005 @yahoo.com.
** Partner, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, Washington D.C.; Independent Expert,
Monsanto Co.; Business Law Faculty Fellow and Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan Law
School. Email: tdickins@umich.edu or timothydickinson@paulhastings.com. We thank participants
at The Louis & Myrtle Moskowitz Conference on The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Doing Business
for helpful comments and suggestions. The Conference was co-sponsored by the University of
Michigan Law School, the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan and
the Michigan Law Review. Our thanks also to the editors of the Michigan Law Review for their




III. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW CORPORATE CZARS .......................... 1727
A. Cash Fines versus Noncash, Monitor-Like Penalties ...... 1727
1. More Influential Monitors ........................................ 1727
2. Monitors More Akin To Advisors .............................. 1731
B. M onitor-Like Sanctions ................................................... 1732
C. D uties for M onitors? ....................................................... 1733
1. More Influential Monitors ...................... 1733
2. Monitors More Akin to Advisors ............................... 1739
D. Back to the Past?: Comparison with Professional
Director Recommendations ............................................. 1741
C O N CL USIO N ....................................................................................... 1742
A PPEN D IX ........................................................................................... 1744
INTRODUCTION
Following the recent spate of corporate scandals, government enforce-
ment authorities have increasingly relied upon corporate monitors to help
ensure law compliance and reduce the number of future violations.' These
monitors also permit enforcement authorities, such as the Securities & Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") and others, to leverage their enforcement
resources in overseeing corporate behavior. However, there are few
descriptive or normative analyses of the role and scope of corporate moni-
tors.2 This paper provides such an analysis.
We begin with an operative definition of corporate monitors-people
appointed to supervise a firm for a certain period of time as part of a De-
ferred Prosecution Agreement ("DPA") or a NonProsecution Agreement
("NPA"). Such agreements are entered into by government regulators and
the firms that are the subject of enforcement actions. If the firm satisfies the
terms of this agreement, then prosecution can be avoided.' The monitor's
range of influence in these agreements may be limited to only compliance
issues or may extend more broadly to many (or all) aspects of the firm's
operations. Further, the monitor's compensation is paid for by the firm.
With this definition in mind, we move on to Part I where we sketch the
historical development of corporate monitors in order to better understand
the enforcement background against which they developed. Part II then ex-
amines the most common features of the current set of monitor
I. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
June 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=930240; Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What
Happens To A Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agree-
ments, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1867 (2005); CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, CRIME WITHOUT
CONVICTION: THE RISE OF DEFERRED AND NON PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (2005),
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
2. The papers cited in note I examine corporate monitors from the perspective of criminal
law, whereas we examine it from the perspective of its impact on corporate governance. For a dis-
cussion on some corporate governance perspectives, see John C. Coffee Jr., Deferred Prosecution:
Has it gone too far?, NAT'L L.J., July 25, 2005, at 13.
3. See Garrett, supra note I (manuscript at 26); Greenblum, supra note 1, at 1863.
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appointments providing us with an overview of this new enforcement
mechanism. The details of these arrangements are supplemented by inter-
views with monitors to provide a deeper sense of how these mechanisms
work. Part III follows with a normative analysis that examines when it is
desirable to appoint monitors and what powers and obligations they should
have. Based on this analysis, we provide a number of recommendations for
enhancing the potential of corporate monitors to serve a useful deterrent and
law enforcement function without being unduly burdensome on corpora-
tions. We conclude with recommendations and observations on the potential
growth of the corporate monitor.
I. FROM MASTER TO MONITOR
Although corporate monitors are relatively recent law-enforcement in-
novations, they have long and deep historical roots. We begin by discussing
the antecedents of the corporate monitor in order to better understand the
context in which the monitor developed.
A. Historical Underpinnings
The corporate monitor of today can be traced to the special masters of
the past.4 Special masters originated in the use of adjuncts to the judiciary in
English Chancery practices dating back to the early sixteenth century.5 Thus,
the use of outside supervisory resources has a lengthy historical pedigree.
Moreover, the evolution of the corporate monitor follows in a somewhat
logical progression from a court's use of "outside" resources to leverage its
own supervisory objectives. We begin by examining how these special mas-
ters operated and how the corporate monitor sprung from them.
A number of scholars have analyzed the appointment authority and du-
6
ties of special masters. Indeed, it seems courts have often turned to outside
parties for assistance, both with prejudgment adjudicatory activities such as
the course of discovery and with postjudgment duties such as calculation of
damages and implementation and monitoring of consent decrees, particu-
larly in employment discrimination class actions.
4. See Linda J. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part 11: The American Analogue, 50
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1321-22 (1975).
5. id. at 1322 n.149 ("Masters were used and appointed by the chancery from at least the
reign of Henry VIII on." (citing I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 416-18 (A.L.
Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. rev., Sweet & Maxwell 1956))).
6. See e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary
or Reshaping Adjudication? 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986); David I. Levine, The Authority for the
Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History
Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753 (1984).
7. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SPECIAL MASTERS' INCIDENCE
AND ACTIVITY: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES




The power to appoint such outside parties appears to stem from at least
two sources. First, as Justice Brandeis succinctly said in 1920:
Courts have.., inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate in-
struments required for the performance of their duties. This power includes
authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in
the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the pro-
gress of a cause."
Second, Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically author-
izes special masters (unless a statute provides otherwise) to perform duties
consented to by the parties, hold trial proceedings, make or recommend
findings of fact on issues in certain circumstances, and address pretrial and
post-trial matters that cannot be attended to effectively and in a timely man-
ner by an available district or magistrate judge.9
Although special masters provide a template on which to build corporate
monitors, they do not provide the strict legal bases for the appointment of
monitors. Neither Rule 53 nor the court's inherent powers are the basis for• I0
the appointment of monitors. Corporate monitors are appointed as part of a
negotiated settlement before judgment between a firm and a government
enforcement agency." These settlements are termed Deferred Prosecution
Agreements or Non-Prosecution Agreements. 2 The monitor is then a condi-
tion of the DPA or NPA (much like a monetary penalty). We discuss how
this negotiated entity developed below.
B. RICO and Beyond
The closest recent ancestors of the modem corporate monitor appeared
roughly twenty-five years ago with the implementation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). Between 1982 and
2004, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed at least twenty civil cases
asserting RICO violations and, in virtually every case, won the appointment
of a trustee, monitor, or other form of court-appointed overseer.3 Thus, there
was an increase in the appointment of people who had some kind of con-
tinuing oversight responsibilities for a corporation. However, these people
were appointed as a result of a postjudgment action, whereas the corporate
8. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (citation omitted).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a). Perhaps most striking from a historical context is the lack of de-
bate, until relatively recent times, about the authority of courts to make such appointments. See
Levine, supra note 6.
10. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53(a); Levine, supra note 6.
11. See James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management: Lessons
from Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859, 910 (2006).
12. See CORPORATE CIuME REPORTER, supra note 1; James K. Robinson et al., Deferred
prosecutions and the independent monitor, 2 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 325, 326-27
(2005).
13. James B. Jacobs et al., The RICO Trusteeships after Twenty Years: A Progress Report, 19
LAB. LAW. 419, 452 (2004).
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monitor is primarily a creation of DPAs and NPAs (i.e., settlements) be-
tween regulators and firms before any court verdict is announced.
Settlements were also increasingly used by enforcement authorities. We
can see this in the cease-and-desist orders that the SEC used as part of its
consent decrees. 4 These orders permitted the SEC to hold companies in
contempt if they violated the terms of the cease-and-desist order which was
part of the negotiated settlement (i.e., consent decree).15 Such settlements
did not, however, include any ongoing supervisory function by an outside
party.
16
Thus, RICO provides the modem antecedents for ongoing supervisors or
monitors after a court judgment, and the SEC's cease-and-desist orders to
police settlements regulators reached with firms are examples of negotiated
prejudgment settlements (i.e., consent decrees). The corporate monitor re-
flects the confluence of these two streams-ongoing supervision 6 la RICO
and supervision of a negotiated settlement with a government regulator d la
SEC cease-and-desist orders.
C. Prudential and DOJ Memoranda
As these enforcement methods developed, regulators began to experiment
with various types of settlements leading to the landmark 1994 Prudential
Securities case in which the government provided for the first modem ap-
pointment of an independent expert whose role was to monitor compliance of
the company as per a DPA."' Unlike more contemporary DPAs and NPAs, the
Prudential arrangement was reached through a series of letters from the com-
pany's counsel to the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York"s
14. BellSouth Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 45,279, 2002 WL 47167 (Jan. 15, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Iitigation/admin/34-45279.htm; Chiquita Brands Int'l Inc., Ex-
change Act Release No. 44,902, 75 SEC Docket 2308 (Oct. 3, 2001); Am. Bank Note Holographics,
Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7994, Exchange Act Release No. 44,563, 75 SEC Docket 912 (July
18, 2001); KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 44,050, 74 SEC Docket 1351
(Mar. 8, 2001); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 43,761, 73 SEC Docket 2987
(Dec. 21, 2000).
15. See, e.g., Vanessa Blum, Justice Deferred, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at 8; Press Re-
lease, SEC, SEC charges Time Warner with Fraud, Aiding and Abetting Frauds by Others, and
Violating a Prior Cease-and-Desist Order (March 21, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2005-38.htm.
16. See supra note 14.
17. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 94-2189
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1994), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/
prudential.pdf; see also SEC v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2164, 1993 WL 473189, at *2-3
(D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1993).
18. Letter from Scott W. Muller & Carey R. Dunne, Davis Polk & Wardwell, counsel to
Prudential Sec., Inc., to Kenneth J. Vianale & Baruch Weiss, Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S. Dist.
of N.Y., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Oct. 13, 1994), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
documents/prudential.pdf [hereinafter Letter from PSI].
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and a response from the Department of Justice," along with a complaint that
20
set out the alleged violations.
Of particular note in this case are the factors raised by Prudential as rea-
sons why a criminal prosecution of Prudential Securities Incorporated
("PSI," the Prudential subsidiary implicated in the wrongdoing) would be
inappropriate. The government adopted this reasoning to justify why a de-
ferral of prosecution was eventually chosen. These factors included (1) the
time of the alleged misconduct (i.e. during the tenure of prior management);
(2) the time lag from the alleged conduct to the prosecution; (3) the fact that
PSI had spent over $1 billion to fund and administer claims of investors; (4)
the fact that PSI accepted responsibility for all valid investor claims (includ-
ing, according to PSI, $330 million in its settlement with the SEC, $41
million to state and federal regulators, $490 million in settlements with in-
vestors, and $195 million in expenses and legal fees); and (5) that PSI
cooperated extensively with government investigators and enhanced its
compliance efforts.2'
Following Prudential, the DOJ and SEC increasingly relied on the cor-
porate "monitor" or independent expert in settlements. For example, two
years after Prudential, Coopers & Lybrand settled charges of bid rigging,
concealing information, and lying during grand jury testimony.22 This re-
sulted in a corporate monitor with even more authority than that of the
monitor overseeing Prudential.23 Thus, even before the corporate scandals of
Enron and Worldcom and the brave new world of Sarbanes-Oxley, this rela-
tively new form of enforcement tool was coming to life.24
However, there was a lack of understanding-some might say outright
confusion-as to when monitors might be appointed as part of a DPA or
NPA and, more generally, when corporations themselves might be charged
criminally. Such uncertainty was eventually recognized and partially ad-
dressed by the government with the publication in 1999 of the "Federal
19. Letter from Kenneth J. Vianale & Baruch Weiss, Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S. Dist.
of N.Y., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Scott W. Muller & Carey R. Dunne, Davis Polk & Wardwell, coun-
sel to Prudential Sec., Inc. (October 27, 1994), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
documents/prudential.pdf.
20. See Complaint at 1, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 94-2189 (S.D.N.Y. Octo-
ber 27, 1994). This includes a long list of violations, such as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff; 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5; and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
21. See Letter from PSI, supra note 18, at 9 ("[Prudential will] cooperate with the Govern-
ment and let 'the chips fall as they may.' ").
22. CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, supra note 1.
23. For a comparison of monitoring assignments, see infra Appendix.
24. While some scholars refer to this evolution as having a genesis in the mandate of the
pretrial-services agencies as early as the 1970s, it was not until Prudential that the modern-day
concept of an outside independent expert paid for by the offending company was put into effect,
with the Coopers & Lybrand case soon following suit. See Greenblum, supra note 1, at 1867 (credit-
ing the inclusion of deferrals in pretrial-services practices for their wide use).
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Prosecution of Corporations," which soon became known as the "Holder
Memo."25
The Holder Memo set out eight factors for prosecutors to consider in
their deliberations as to whether a criminal case should be brought for cor-
porate malfeasance: (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense, (2) the
pervasiveness of the wrongdoing, (3) the prior conduct of the company, (4)
whether the company voluntarily disclosed the wrongdoing and its will-
ingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, (5) the adequacy of
the company's compliance program, (6) the remedial actions taken by the
company to deal with the wrongdoing, (7) the impact a prosecution might
have on innocent third parties, and (8) the alternative mechanisms prose-
26
cutors might choose to punish the company. Thus, the Holder Memo
provided parties with greater insight into what prosecutors were going to
consider when determining whether and what enforcements actions would
be taken. This encouraged companies to take steps such as beefing up
compliance programs in order to enhance their chances for a lesser sanc-
tion or avoiding prosecution altogether.
However, the Holder Memo provides little guidance on the factors to be
considered in appointing a monitor as part of a DPA or NPA. As a result,
some cite the addition of a ninth factor, the cooperation of the company,
which was added in the now-famous "Thompson Memo" (issued by then
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson in 2003), as the primary factor
that has led to the modern-day monitor/independent expert.27 The differ-
ence between this ninth factor and the Holder Memo's fourth factor
may be that in the Thompson memo, cooperation increasingly meant waiv-
ing attorney-client privilege. Following the issuance of the Thompson
Memo, government authorities appear to have put monitors into action
28 29in a wide range of cases, including securities fraud, tax fraud,
25. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All
Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
fraud/policy/chargingcorps.html.
26. Id.
27. See Greenblum, supra note 1, at 1875 n.84 ("There is consensus, however, that the
Thompson Memo was ultimately a catalyst for an increase in corporate deferrals.").
28. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
Mag. No. 05-6076 (RJH) (D.N.J. June 15, 2005); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v.
Am. Online, Inc., No. 1:04 M 1133 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2004); Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
United States v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., Mag. No. 04-837 (1LG) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004);
Letter from Andrew J. Coremey & Bonnie Jones, Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S. Dist. of N.Y.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John T. Montgomery, Ropes & Gray LLP, counsel to Aurora Foods, Inc.
(Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/aurora.pdf.
29. See e.g., Letter from Michael J. Garcia, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Christopher S. Rizek & Schott D. Michel, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, counsel to
HVB Risk Mgmt. Prods. Inc., HVB U.S. Fin. Inc., and HVB Am., Inc. (Feb. 13, 2006), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime blog/files/hvb-deferredprosecution-agreement
.pdf [hereinafter HVB Letter]; Letter from David N. Kelly, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Robert S. Bennett, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, counsel to




and at least six cases involving charges under the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act ("FCPA"). °
While each of these cases involves different circumstances, and in each
case the monitor has different duties and obligations, it appears that the
scope of the monitor's powers is increasing. For example, the recent dis-
missal of both the CEO and general counsel of Bristol-Myers Squibb as a
result of recommendations by Bristol's monitor underscores this increasing
power." This was further articulated by Judge Rakoff in his final judgment
in the WorldCom case:
While the Corporate Monitor's efforts were initially directed at preventing
corporate looting and document destruction, his role and duties have stead-
ily expanded, with the parties' full consent, to the point where he now acts
not only as financial watchdog (in which capacity he has saved the com-
pany tens of millions of dollars) but also as an overseer who has initiated
vast improvements in the company's internal controls and corporate gov-
32ernance.
Through this brief historical sketch, we can see that these various over-
sight institutions developed and morphed over time. However, the presence
and increasing power of monitors raises a number of questions. For example,
when is it appropriate to appoint an outside supervisor like a monitor, and
should monitors have fiduciary duties or other obligations to shareholders?
These and other questions must be examined and resolved before we can ade-
quately assess whether monitors are accomplishing their goals. In the next
Part we lay out the process of appointing corporate monitors and their powers,
followed in Part III with an analysis of the questions noted above.
II. THE PROCESS OF APPOINTING CORPORATE MONITORS
AND THEIR POWERS
The underlying investigation into alleged wrongdoing is the starting
point for our inquiry. Once an investigation is started, the government gath-
ers information and decides whether it will investigate further, pursue
charges, or drop the investigation. If the investigation is not dropped, then
the issue becomes whether the case will proceed to charging and adjudica-
tion or settle before then.
30. See, e.g., Diagnostic Prod. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 51,724, 85 SEC Docket 1319
(May 20, 2005); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. SSI Int'l Far East, LTD, No. CR 06-
398 (D. Or. Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.secinfo.con/dlznFa.v22t.d.htm#1stPage; Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Monsanto Co., No. 1:05-cr-008-ESH-ALL (D.D.C. Jan. 6,
2005) [hereinafter Monsanto Agreement]; Agreement between Criminal Div., Fraud Section, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, and InVision Techs., Inc. (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://
www.corporatecimereporter.com/documents/invisionl.pdf; Agreement between Criminal Div., Fraud
Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, and Micrus Corp. and Micrus S.A. (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.con/documents/micrus.pdf.
31. Brooke A. Masters, Bristol-Myers Ousts Its Chief at Monitor's Urging, WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 2006, at DI.
32. SECv. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431,432 (S.D.N.Y 2003).
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Both the government and the firm have strong incentives to settle the
case. For the government, corporate crime cases are difficult, complex, and
expensive cases to prosecute and tend to use a great deal of resources.33 In
addition, corporations normally have access to greater resources than the
average criminal defendant, which increases the likelihood of a vigorous
defense and potential appeals. Thus, from the government's perspective, it
might be better to obtain something certain through a settlement rather than
to take its chances with a lengthy, complex, and expensive trial.
For the firm and its executives, the advantages of settling early or avoid-
ing charges can be significant. The avoidance of severe reputational losses
may be significant enough to motivate firms and executives to settle. In par-
ticular, executives who may face the threat of prison might be strongly
inclined to settle their own charges, as well as the corporation's. Thus, both
parties have strong incentives to settle, leading to many DPAs and NPAs.35
As part of the DPA or NPA, the government frequently seeks to have a
monitor appointed with ongoing supervisory responsibility over the firm or
some aspect of its operations. This helps to leverage enforcement resources
but also may be useful in some other instances that we discuss below. The
powers of monitors can vary-and increasingly they have extensive pow-
ers-but they are normally appointed for limited terms.3 6 It is important to
note that if a monitor is not satisfied with the firm's efforts, then, in certain
cases, the monitor can recommend to the enforcement agency that the DPA
be removed and a prosecution be restarted. This might have disastrous con-
sequences for the firm and its executives. Indeed, some suggest that Bristol-
Myers may have fired their CEO and general counsel to induce their moni-
tor not to seek removal of the DPA.37
To obtain a better sense of what monitoring arrangements are like, we
discuss the kinds of cases in which monitors have been appointed, who are
the most likely monitors, and what has been the scope of their powers to
date. We examined twenty-five cases in which DPAs or NPAs required the• •• 38
appointment of someone with ongoing supervisory responsibility. In these
cases, we found that eleven were primarily securities fraud cases, three were
primarily tax evasion and fraud cases, six were primarily bribery and FCPA
cases, two were primarily related to suspicious activity reports, two related
to healthcare fraud, and one related to unauthorized exports of defense
33. Cf, Greenblum, supra note 1, at 1884-89 (discussing corporate incentives to settle); Cost
of Litigation Haunts U.S. Corporations More Than Winning Cases, INS. J., Nov. 7, 2005, available
at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/magazines/east/2005/11/07/features/62312.htm (discussing
costs of corporate litigation); Litigation Trends Continue to Mount Worldwide; Insurers Face Five
Times the Average Number of Lawsuits, INs. J., Oct. 11, 2006, available at http:/www.
insurancejoumal.comlnews/national/2006/10/1 /73220.htm (same).
34. See Robinson et al., supra note 12, at 327 (comparing the repercussions of KPMG's
acceptance of a DPA with Arthur Andersen's rejection of a DPA).
35. See CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, supra note 1.
36. See infra Appendix.
37. See Masters, supra note 31.
38. For a fuller description, see infra Appendix.
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articles. 39 These categories overlap somewhat because the SEC has required
monitors in some FCPA cases where it found a fundamental breakdown in
financial controls (which may be correlated with increased chances for fi-
nancial restatements and securities fraud).4
From our perspective, the importance of this is that the practice of using
monitors is not isolated to one particular area of regulation but rather seems
to be used with increasing frequency in a number of areas. 4' Thus, the SEC,
the DOJ, the IRS, and others have all used monitors. Although the use of
monitors has not reached endemic proportions just yet, it may be likely in
the future. For example, the World Bank is now considering how to impose
this feature in their projects and disciplinary actions.42 Moreover, it has been
rumored that the government's insistence on a monitor was one of the key
elements causing the collapse of negotiations and subsequent indictment of
the law firm of Milberg Weiss.43
Although monitors have been appointed in a number of different areas,
the identities of monitors have tended to be fairly uniform. Of the thirteen
DPAs for which monitor identity and experience is available, the vast major-
ity are former judges, prosecutors, or SEC attorneys.'4 But a more
fundamental issue lies in the question of who actually selects the monitor:
the firm or the government agency? In some cases, the agency provides an
approved list of candidates from which to choose, and in others, the agency• 41
simply retains veto power over the appointment. In any case, it is clear that
39. For DPAs/NPAs involving AIG-FP Pagic Equity Holding Corp., AmSouth Bancorpora-
tion, America Online Inc., Aurora Foods, Inc., Bank of New York, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., InVision Techs., Inc., KPMG,
Merrill Lynch & Co., Micrus Corp. & Micrus S.A., Monsanto Co., N.Y. Racing Ass'n, Prudential
Sec. Inc., and Symbol Tech., see CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, supra note 1.
For the DPAs/NPAs of additional companies, see Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United
States v. Roger Williams Med. Ctr., No. 06-02T (D.R.I. Jan. 30, 2006), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.comlwhitecollarcrime blog/files/roger_williams deferredsentence_
agreement.pdf; Agreement between U.S. Attorneys for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. and the E. Dist. of
Va., U.S. Dep't of Justice, and Boeing Co. (June 30, 2006), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/boeing2.pdf; Agreement between U.S.
Attorney for the Dist. of N.J., U.S. Dep't of Justice, and the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.
(Dec. 31, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/filespdffiles/UMDNJFINALDPA.pdf;
HVB Letter supra note 29; Letter from Alice H. Martin, U.S. Attorney for the N. Dist. of Ala., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Robert S. Bennett, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, counsel to
HealthSouth Corp. (May 17, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/aln/Docs/May%
202006/healthsouthnonpros2.pdf.
40. See Monsanto Agreement, supra note 30. The trend is clear that in most FCPA cases in
which inadequate financial controls are the cause of an FCPA books and records or financial con-
trols violations, a monitor will result.
41. See CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, supra note 1.
42. See DEP'T OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY, WORLD BANK, VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PRO-
GRAM (VDP) GUIDELINES FOR PARTICIPANTS 12-13 (2006), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTVOLDISPRO/Resources/VDPGuidelinesforParticipants.pdf.
43. See Justin Scheck, Milberg Weiss Weighs Non-Prosecution Deal, RECORDER, May 16,
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleFriendlyCA.jsp?id= 1147696533653.
44. Several monitors were both former judges and prosecutors or former prosecutors and
SEC attorneys.
45. See Robinson et al., supra note 12, at 332.
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the agency has tremendous bargaining power given the weight of potential
criminal penalties and imprisonment for the executives. It is perhaps not a
stretch to say that the agency, in effect, chooses the monitor, even though it
is the firm that pays for the monitor's services.
Finally, it becomes imperative to discuss the powers that monitors seem to
possess. The process of determining their powers is a negotiation between the
46
firm and the government resulting in a DPA or NPA. The more detail pro-
vided in the DPA or NPA, the more smoothly the negotiation might proceed.
Table 1 provides a quick sketch of the most common terms of monitoring ar-
rangements based on the DPAs or NPAs we examined listed in Appendix A.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF DPA/NPA CHARACTERISTICS
CHARACTERISTIC DESCRIPTION
Charges Securities Fraud: 11
Tax Evasion: 3
FCPA or Bribery: 6
Suspicious Activity: 2
Healthcare Fraud: 2
Unauthorized Export of Defense Articles: 1
Fines and Restitution Fine Range (where known): $450,000 to $428 Million
Restitution (where known): $7 Million to $839 Million
Duration/Term (Months) 12 to 36 is the norm with 60 months as the upper end
Extension of Duration About half provide for some kind of extension
Background of Monitor Large majority of known monitors are former government
enforcement agents (SEC or Prosecutor) or Judges
Selection Bases Large majority selected by mutual agreement
Reports to Primarily audit committee and appointing government agency
Powers Greatly vary ranging from important advisor on aspects of
compliance to considerably greater say in the operation of the
firm (e.g., firing/dismissing employees)
Roughly one-third (7) of DPAs/NPAs provide broad ranging
powers to monitor
The broader cases are becoming more common (e.g., KPMG,
WorldCom, RWMC)
Remuneration Firm usually pays monitor hourly rate along with assistants,
office space, and so forth
Addressing Disputes Monitor essentially decides what happens (if firm does not
Between Monitor and Firm comply the DPA may be withdrawn or a fraud charge initiated)
Sometimes firm can ask for review by agency
Replace Monitor No DPA/NPA explicitly provides firm with a way to replace a
monitor
In about 3 or 4 instances the firm can choose a successor for a
monitor if that monitor leaves on his/her own
Postmonitoring Obligations Majority (15) expect this in some measure
46. We will occasionally refer to the firm as a "monitee," a term we have coined.
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It appears that monitors are granted wide powers and considerable lati-
tude, while government agencies obtain quite favorable terms for potential
future actions. For example, attorney-client privilege is often waived (in-
deed, this is often required before a DPA or NPA will be considered);
monitors are granted substantial power to oversee what the firm is doing;
monitors cannot be easily replaced (indeed, even selling the firm does not
necessarily terminate the monitoring obligation); monitors may be entrusted
with making both important and day-to-day decisions; monitors may have
the power to restructure a corporation's internal processes; and monitors'
work may be protected by attorney work-product doctrine; among many
other powers. Furthermore, the extent of the monitor's powers seems to be
expanding, and these powers are often not defined with great precision in
DPAs and NPAs.47
At some level, it is surprising that corporations have ceded so much
power to the monitor in these negotiated DPAs and NPAs. One explanation
may be that, to date, corporations and government agencies do not appear to
negotiate the details of a monitor's assignments early on in the DPA process.
Based on our interviews to date, our sense is that the parties appear to con-
sider the concerns in the following order: first, the charges asserted by the
government; second, the size of the fine imposed; third, the ability to obtain
an NPA or DPA; and fourth, toward the end of the predisposition process,
the terms of the appointment of a monitor. Although this is certainly under-
standable at times (e.g., the American International Group ("AIG") case,
which involved a fine of $1.6 billion and a serious possibility of criminal•41
indictment), one might expect increasing attention would be paid to the
identity of the monitor and the terms of the monitor's engagement given the
increasing power of the monitor. After all, many companies may be in a po-
sition where, once the initial shock of criminal fines and charges has worn
off, they are left wondering what to do with their new "best friend."
Further, the lack of clarity early on may also reflect the fact that there
will be some matters that may be difficult to define fully at the beginning of
the process.49 This means that for the agreement to work, certain mattersmay need to be left a little vague at the beginning. Thus, some flexibility is
47. The recent firings of both the CEO and general counsel of Bristol-Myers Squibb based
on the monitor's recommendations underscore their increasing power. See Masters, supra note 31.
48. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges AIG with Securities Fraud (Feb. 9, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl9560.htm; see also Vikas Bajaj, AIG to Pay $1.6
Billion in Settlement of Fraud Charges, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 9, 2006, Finance, at 14, available
at http://www.iht.com/articles/20O6/02/09/business/aig.php.
49. One unavoidable major problem that illustrates the difficulty for both parties in this
entire undertaking is the simple fact that until the engagement letter is signed, the monitor can only
speculate as to what he or she must undertake to fulfill his or her obligations. After the engagement
letter is fully executed, however, the monitor is unlikely to get permission by the monitee to expand
work scope. As a result, the agreement must almost certainly be prepared with provisos such as
"The monitor shall undertake such investigation and review as necessary to certify to the [SEC] that
the company's compliance program fulfills article X of matter Y." This, of course, still leaves open
the question of what is "necessary."
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necessary, but so is guidance. Maintaining the balance is not easy and is
something we address a little later in Part HI.
Once the DPA or NPA is in place, the monitor takes a more active role.
This usually begins with the monitor getting to know the company, its busi-
ness, and its people, including its board.0 The monitor then develops a work
plan, which generally involves discussing her potential activities with the
firm and government and addressing likely disputes over what documents
should be produced, whom to interview, and how much authority the moni-
tor has to impose changes.5 The less precise the initial language in the DPA
or NPA, the more room there is for both sides (government and firm) to try
to push that language in their desired direction.
Once the monitor's general scope of activity is set in place, then the task
of monitoring begins. This can involve quite frequent visits to the firm and a
number of mid-stream adjustments for both the firm and the monitor. An
increasingly common issue is "scope creep," where the monitor and the firm
disagree about the extent of the monitor's role and purview (e.g., because
the DPA may be unclear on the details). Although our sense is that monitors
usually get what they want, firms seem to be getting more concerned about
the perceived level of interference from monitors. Perhaps this will lead to
more careful negotiating at the time of the DPA or NPA.
Finally, even after the period of monitoring is complete, there is the pos-
sibility of longer-lasting consequences ensuing from a monitor's work.
Monitors almost always file reports with regulators that detail the execution
of their duties and may contain significant changes in corporate processes
and procedures.52 Moreover, some DPAs include ongoing obligations for the
company even after the monitor has completed her tenure.53 Thus, the effects
of the monitoring system are likely to persist past the official end date of the
DPA. Scholars and practitioners alike will be watching closely to see what
long-lasting effects result from a monitor versus the simple imposition of a
large fine. 4
Given the increasing power and frequency of monitors and their poten-
tially large impact on firms, it becomes important to examine when they are
desirable and what powers and duties they should have. Part III engages in
that inquiry. However, before leaving our description of monitors, it may
prove illustrative to compare the monitor to other kinds of ongoing supervi-
sors so that one can further place the monitor in context.
50. See Robinson et al., supra note 12, at 335-37.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 333-34. We consider this a potentially underappreciated aspect of the monitor
mechanism. The reports may prove useful to the firm and form part of the monitor's postmonitoring
legacy, but these reports also may be useful for other firms in similar situations or markets to help
reduce their likelihood of violating laws and potentially improve their internal processes.
53. See supra note 39.
54. For an example of a settlement whose results will be closely monitored, see supra note
48 (regarding the AIG settlement).
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Table 2 below provides a thumbnail comparison between corporate
monitors, corporate probation officers, trustees in bankruptcy, and special
masters. It would appear that the corporate monitor combines aspects of the
other supervisory mechanisms. For example, some monitors may have the
powers of a trustee but have longer-lasting effects (i.e., the postmonitoring
legacy) and apparently less stringent fiduciary duties.55 Moreover, monitors
have both considerably more-frequent contact with the firm and, at times, a
broader scope of involvement than probation officers or special masters;
therefore, monitors may have more information on the firm. The combina-
tion of features represented by the monitor and the flexibility in designing
the scope of the monitor's involvement provides the basis for an increasing
and potentially significant enforcement role for monitors.56
TABLE 2
COMPARING DIFFERENT KINDS OF ONGOING SUPERVISORS
Basis of Frequency of Powers Duties Duration
Appointment Monitoring
Corporate Prejudgment as Very frequent Considerable Unclear- 1 year to 5
Monitor part of Deferred variation- sometimes years, but with
Prosecution narrow to same increasing
Agreement or No broad duties that potential for
Prosecution a lawyer long lasting
Agreement owes to effects
client (legacy)
Corporate Usually Frequent Narrow Duties to Term of
Probation postjudgment and usually (e.g., court sanction
Officer court appointed on wrong
forming basis
of conviction)
Trustee in Usually court Very frequent Broad- Duties to Until entity is
Bankruptcy appointed as part essentially estate no longer in
of bankruptcy running the bankruptcy
proceedings entity
Special Usually court Frequent Narrow Duties to Term of
Master appointed post (usually court sanction or
judgment court
appointment
55. Monitoring arrangements come to an end with the end of the period noted in the DPA or
NPA, and in that respect they are different than consent decrees, which may not have a set end date.
56. In Table 2, we have not focused on the elements that are common among these supervi-
sors (e.g., difficulty of removing them from the firm).
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IllI. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW CORPORATE CZARS
From this description, it appears that the corporate monitor is an increas-
ingly common feature of enforcement actions and possesses wide ranging
and often very significant powers. The increasing presence of monitors
raises a number of important questions that require attention, including the
circumstances under which it is desirable to appoint a monitor, the extent of
the monitors' powers, the scope of their duties, if any, and many others. We
commence our inquiry into some of these questions in this Part.
A. Cash Fines versus Noncash, Monitor-Like Penalties
Let us begin with the most basic question-when is it optimal to require
a firm to have a corporate monitor? This depends in some measure on what
we expect the monitor to do. The discussion in Part II suggests that the
monitor's powers range along a continuum from those of an advisor on
compliance matters to a person who can essentially run the firm. Our analy-
sis is likely to differ based on the extent of the monitor's powers. However,
for expositional ease we will examine the optimality of the more extreme
ends of the continuum-the highly influential monitors and the advisor-like
monitors. As we shall see, the analysis for the advisor-like monitors is quali-
tatively similar to the analysis for the more influential monitors.
1. More Influential Monitors
This could be approached in at least two different ways. First, we could
treat the imposition of the more influential monitor as a sanction and exam-
ine when such a sanction is optimal or desirable.57 Second, we could treat
the monitor as a gatekeeper and examine when such a gatekeeper is desir-
able.58 In reality, these are just different ways of assessing the overall
desirability of monitors. We approach it first as a sanction because most of
the gatekeeper literature treats the gatekeeper as being an entity that is util-
ized even for those who acted legally, 9 whereas a monitor is only used in
cases where an indication of wrongdoing is present-where there is some
hint, if not proof, of illegality. Of course, the desirable formulation and op-
eration of the monitor sanction may benefit from the gatekeeper literature.
Thus, we approach the issue as one of sanctioning informed by the insights
from the gatekeeper literature.
57. For discussion of optimal sanctions, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169 (1968), and A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The
Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PuB. ECON. 89 (1984).
58. For discussions of gatekeepers, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFES-
SIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006), and Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy
of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
59. See Kraakman, supra note 58, at 55-59; see also COFFEE, supra note 58, at 1-5.
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Analyzing the monitor as a type of sanction requires a formulation of
what the optimal sanctions would be and where a monitor fits in that
scheme. We focus on deterrence concerns as the primary goal of optimal
sanctions for our analysis, although we do discuss potential incapacitation
arguments a little later. Generally, it is desirable to use the socially least ex-
pensive sanction to obtain deterrence first and then rely on the socially more
expensive sanctions only if more deterrence is necessary and the deterrent
effect of the less expensive sanctions has been exhausted. 60 In this manner
one can obtain the desired level of deterrence in the socially least expensive
manner.
As a general matter, the least expensive sanctions are those that simply
transfer assets from one party to another (e.g., a cash judgment), whereas
the more expensive sanctions are those that require expenditure by the state
or others that produces some deadweight loss. 6' The quintessential example
would be prison. Prisons are costly to maintain and impose other kinds of
losses on society.62 Thus, if one has the choice between obtaining the same
level of deterrence from a cash fine of $1,000 (which has few social costs
except those associated with transferring the cash) and a prison sentence of
one year (which has prison maintenance and other costs), then it would be
better to use the cash fine as we obtain the desired deterrence at lesser cost.
In the context of corporate defendants, prison is not an option, but cash
fines are not the only kind of sanction available. We could impose greater
than compensatory damages (e.g., punitive damages), deny the corporation a
license to engage in certain businesses, or even impose ongoing supervision
(e.g., a probation officer or a monitor). 6' These latter remedies generally
carry higher social costs than a cash fine. This is because they have ongoing
supervision costs (as compared to the one time cost of a cash fine) and
greater costs associated with calculating their impact (e.g., determining the
losses of being denied a license requires greater effort than determining the
losses of a cash fine).64 Moreover, these penalties are generally not as pre-
65cise as cash fines and hence can result in both over- and underdeterrence.
Further, ongoing supervisory penalties suffer from a particular form of in-
formation weakness. Government agencies and monitors probably have less
knowledge than a corporation's management about the firm and hence may
60. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 57, at 95.
61. Id. at 90, 95, 98; Becker, supra note 57, at 193-98
62. Becker, supra note 57, at 193-98; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 57, at 90, 95, 98.
Monitor-like sanctions have potential incapacitation benefits as well as deterrence benefits, but we
do not discuss those incapacitation benefits and costs in detail in this paper. For discussion of this in
the context of corporate probation officers, see Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation
Under the New Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2033-34 (1992).
63. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1477, 1497-98 (1996).
64. See id.
65. Cf id. at 1503-04.
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make less profit-maximizing decisions than these corporate managers.66 In
light of this, one may prefer to exhaust the deterrent effects of cash fines and
then, if needed, consider imposing these other, more-expensive options.
Before exploring the deterrent effect of cash fines, we hasten to add that
monitor sanctions are not simply all cost. Monitors often have more exper-
tise than management on compliance matters (indeed, this is an important
raison d'etre for a monitor), and this results in benefits for the firm to bal-
ance against the costs of a monitor. However, we do not need a monitor
sanction to obtain this benefit. A large cash fine could induce a firm to hire
an expert to consult on compliance issues (like a monitor), thereby reducing
wrongdoing and avoiding the large cash fines. Thus, this advantage of a
monitor could be obtained with appropriately set cash fines without having
67to rely on an explicit monitor sanction.
Let us then return to the deterrent effects of cash fines. The deterrent ef-
fect of cash fines might be exhausted for a number of reasons, including that
the corporation has no more assets that can be attached or that the sanction
desired for deterrence purposes is so high that it is politically or morally
unacceptable and hence cannot be imposed.61 When the highest-imposable
cash fine does not generate the desired level of deterrence, other sanctions,
such as corporate monitors, merit consideration. In such situations, a moni-
tor may be desirable if the net gains of having a monitor are greater than the
net gains of other kinds of sanctions. The net gains are the additional deter-
rence gains from having a monitor less the costs of requiring a monitor.
When might these conditions hold? Let us begin with trying to ascertain
when deterrence might require such a large cash fine that it is unlikely to be
imposed. This seems more likely for wrongdoing that causes a great deal of
harm because then it is more likely that the highest imposable cash fine may
not suffice for deterrence. Corporate monitors and other kinds of ongoing
supervisors seem more justifiable for wrongdoing that causes a great deal of
harm. 69
66. See Wray, supra note 62, at 2020 (discussing this and citing Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal
Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 Am. CRIM. L.
REV. 513, 572 (1989)). Of course, monitors are not usually appointed to run the firm in a more
profit-maximizing manner than management but probably to run the firm in a more law-compliant
manner.
67. This argument raises an interesting question: if monitors help to reduce law violations
(which we think they do) and reduce the substantial penalties finns face, then we would expect firms
to hire these monitors themselves without a DPA or NPA being needed to impose monitors on them.
The question is why firms are not doing this themselves. There could be a number of reasons for
this: (1) fines are not large enough to make it worthwhile to voluntarily hire monitors, (2) the firms
are unaware of the advantages of having someone like a monitor, or (3) the monitor may not be that
valuable for all firms. The first reason leads us to enhance corporate sanctions and the second to
advertise the benefits of compliance officers rather than force a monitor on the firm.
68. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized In-
quiry into the Prblem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 386, 390 (1981); Khanna, supra
note 63, at 1498-99.
69. To be precise, monitors are probably more desirable when the harm caused is large rela-
tive to the assets of the firm causing the harm. However, a good proxy is simply when great harm is
caused because when the harm is great, fewer firms will have assets sufficient to pay for it.
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Another situation in which ongoing supervision may be considered is
when the corporation is a recidivist. 7° When a corporation violates the same
law more than once, one might surmise that fines are not a sufficient
deterrent to this corporation. This may be, but it does not mean that one
should resort to monitor-like sanctions. The fine may be insufficient simply
because it is too low. A natural response might be to try to increase the fine.
If we have reached the limit for the maximum imposable fine, then the ra-
tionale for going to monitor-like sanctions is really that the deterrent effect
of fines is exhausted (as noted above). Another reason why a defendant may
be recidivist is that the defendant receives large gains from the activity that
exceed the fines (even the larger ones). This, by itself, may also not be
enough to justify abandoning fines. For example, if someone regularly dou-
ble parks for an important reason (e.g., emergency room doctors), should we
impose monitors on them? On the other hand, if they double park for so-
cially unacceptable reasons (e.g., to annoy parking officials), then we may
want some greater measures like monitors.7' Our point is not that recidivism
is not sometimes a reason to opt for monitor-like sanctions but rather that by
itself recidivism may not be enough without further inquiry. An additional
complication in the corporate context is that sometimes recidivist behavior
is the result of errant management, in which case it might be better to im-
72
pose sanctions directly on management rather than on the firm.
Another rationale for imposing monitors might be that they save en-
forcement resources for the government. Enforcement agencies may be able
to reduce their expenditures on enforcement and supervision by essentially
subcontracting out the supervisory task to monitors. Enforcement resources
are saved because the government does not pay for the monitor; the corpora-
tion does. This might be treated as a desirable division of labor, given its
costs, if it frees up enough government enforcement resources that more
cases can be brought and more deterrence achieved.73
Which of these justifications is in play has important implications for
when it is optimal to impose a monitor-like sanction. If our justification is
that monitors might be desirable when cash fines are not high enough, then
monitors are preferred in cases of great harm or where firms are insolvent. If
our justification is saving enforcement resources, then monitors are pre-
ferred when the costs of having a monitor are less than the enforcement
advantages gained when the government economizes on enforcement re-
sources. This justification may not be tied to the amount of harm from the
wrongdoing. Finally, recidivist corporations provide a more nuanced under-
70. Wray, supra note 62, at 2021.
71. See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1236-38 (1985).
72. We assume in this paragraph that the management present at the time of the last wrong
and this wrong are the same. If they are not, then different concerns also arise. See Khanna, supra
note 63, at 1509-12.
73. In a sense, the payment to the monitor can be seen as an additional cash sanction (paid
over time) on the firm along with the costs of having the monitor influencing decisions.
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standing of when monitors are preferred. Outside of these instances, how-
ever, the appointment of a monitor may not be desirable on deterrence
grounds.
However, one might also view the monitor as a way to incapacitate a
corporation from committing future wrongdoing.4 Although certainly plau-
sible, it is not clear that this rationale motivates government agencies in
imposing a monitor. Monitors are appointed as part of DPAs or NPAs and
one of the critical conditions before the government agrees for such agree-
ments is that the firm cooperate with law enforcement (e.g., by waiving
attorney-client privilege). This arrangement is more consistent with a corpo-
ration that is trying not to violate the law in the future and probably less in
need of incapacitation.
Moreover, even if incapacitation is important in some of the monitoring
cases, that does not by itself change the foregoing analysis.75 Incapacitation
is presumably an important consideration when we think the defendant is
unlikely to be deterred from future wrongdoing by a cash fine or other pen-
alty.76 If so, then incapacitation arguments become more compelling whendeterrence has failed, which is consistent with the analysis in this section.
2. Monitors More Akin To Advisors
So far the analysis has focused only on the influential monitors who are
more similar to the top management of a firm. However, a number of moni-
toring assignments position the monitor as being an advisor whom the firm
cannot easily ignore. Thus, monitors may inform management that certain
plans are not compliant with the law and others are. The monitor in these
assignments cannot force the firm to adopt a particular plan but rather can
tell the firm not to follow certain plans or the DPA may be revoked and
prosecution initiated.
If this is the scope of the monitoring assignment, the conceptual frame-
work described above still applies, but the margins are somewhat different.
For example, the monitor-advisor is less costly to the firm than the influen-
tial monitor, and hence the social cost is less (though still higher than cash
fines). However, for recidivist corporations, the monitor-advisor may be less
valuable than the influential monitor. In any case, the critical point is that
the conceptual framework above would apply but with a lesser cost for the
monitor-advisor and fewer benefits than the influential monitor.
Before moving on to examine the scope of the monitor's powers and du-
ties, we wish to address one potential argument. That is, sometimes we want
companies to change how they do business and the most direct method of
74. On incapacitation generally, see Robinson, et al., supra note 12, and Shavell, supra note
71.
75. Some of the cases in the Appendix, infra, involve firms that are insolvent or near to it. In
such cases, incapacitating remedies may have greater impact than cash fines, which we know the
firm cannot pay. Even so, the majority of the cases in the Appendix do not involve insolvent firms.
76. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1201-05 (1985); Shavell, supra note 71, at 1237-38.
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doing this is to appoint someone to oversee these changes. We do not con-
sider this a fully persuasive reason to appoint a monitor. If imposing a cash
fine would prod such a company (and other similar companies) to make
these changes to behavior, then there is no need to use a socially more costly
monitor remedy. If the cash fine is insufficient to induce these changes, and
we still want these changes, then a monitor becomes potentially desirable-
however, this is just another way to say that when the deterrent effect of a
cash fine is insufficient we may consider other more costly sanctions (e.g.,
monitors).77
B. Monitor-Like Sanctions
If after careful thought it appears that monitor-like sanctions might be
desirable, then we face further questions about how to structure the ar-
rangement. The first thing to note is that monitor-like sanctions refer to a
variety of ongoing supervisory mechanisms, including corporate monitors,
special masters, probation officers, and others. This is more than a question
of labels; rather, it is a question of which combination of features (powers)
we want in the entity responsible for ongoing supervision.
Although an exhaustive analysis of monitor powers is outside the scope
of this paper, some important criteria can be identified that would assist in
making these determinations. We suggest that the type of wrongdoing, the
type of firm, and the desirability of having access to great amounts of in-
formation are critical.
First, the different types of supervisors tend to have differing access to
information. Because some corporate monitors play a fairly active role in
the firm, they are likely to have access to more current and detailed informa-
tion than special masters or probation officers who have less frequent and
perhaps less interventionist contact with the firm. In light of this, corporate
monitors may be desirable when this level of information access is desir-
able. This is more likely for certain wrongs than others. For example, if the
wrong can be spotted and deterred by occasional oversight, then the detailed
access and powers of corporate monitors would not be necessary. However,
for other kinds of wrongdoing, a more continuous supervisory function may
be needed to deter future wrongdoing (e.g., securities fraud or misreport-
ing). Further, the monitor's greater access to information also implies that
among the various supervisors it is the least likely to make inefficient deci-
sions. This is more valuable when the costs of making wrong decisions are
substantial.7 s
77. Another argument might be that for the period of the monitoring assignment, it is accept-
able for the corporation to make fewer profits as an additional penalty for wrongdoing. Our response
is that if such a penalty is desired, it is better that it be imposed explicitly because then at least its
magnitude can be calculated. Relying on monitors not to run the corporation with a profit-
maximizing focus (legally) as well as management seems a rather imprecise way of penalizing a
firm and is likely to lead to either over- or underdeterrence.
78. See Kraakman, supra note 58, at 62-66 (providing an analogous discussion for gate-
keepers who act as "bouncers" and "chaperones").
1732 [Vol. 105:1713
The Corporate Monitor
Finally, certain firms may benefit more from a closer supervisory rela-
tionship than others. This may be the case for firms that have a history of
law violation or for firms in industries where, without closer supervision,
wrongdoing is quite likely.
We hasten to note that monitor assignments can be drafted to achieve the
desired combination of effects. For example, if the wrongdoing does not
require constant oversight, we could draft the monitor arrangement to essen-
tially mimic a probation arrangement. The flexibility of the monitor and the
negotiated nature of its existence provide a great deal more scope for tailor-
ing than perhaps other arrangements. This is one of its advantages.
C. Duties for Monitors?
Having discussed when monitor-like sanctions may be desirable and
what factors may lead us to choose corporate monitors over other kinds of
supervisors, we now move on to consider what duties, if any, monitors
should owe to the corporation and its shareholders. This greatly depends on
the monitor's powers. As we saw in Part II, the powers of monitors differ,
with some being important advisors (like attorneys) and others having more
operational control of the firm (like management). The duties of these dif-
ferent kinds of monitors may likewise differ. Let us begin with the more
powerful species of monitor.
1. More Influential Monitors
For monitors wielding a great deal of power over the firm and its profit-
ability, it would appear that, at first cut, some duties to the shareholders
should exist. This is consistent with other areas of law where those who
have control over other people's assets owe duties to those people. For ex-
ample, managers of a firm owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and
shareholders whose assets they control. 79 To examine this in more detail, we
lay out the standard case for why fiduciary duties attach to managers and
then examine how those arguments may apply in the context of more influ-
ential monitors.
a. The Standard Case for Fiduciary Duties for Managers
A well-known feature of modem corporations is that the incentives of
managers and shareholders may diverge.'o This increases the agency costs of
79. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 239-40 (2003); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90-92 (1991).
80. E.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 91-92. For example, if a particular
investment required $100 of management effort to produce $500 in profits for the firm, then share-
holders would prefer that management make that expenditure. However, if managers are paid 10%
of firm profits, then they will be unwilling to expend $100 worth of their effort unless the firm prof-
its by at least $1,000. This sort of example can be generated for many other kinds of corporate
decisions as well (e.g., perquisites).
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the manager-shareholder relationship. Absent some method of containing
these costs, some of these relationships may not be formed, and the gains
from them would be lost." Both market forces and the law serve in some
measure to reduce these agency costs enough to make it profitable for the
parties to enter into this relationship.
Market forces are reflected in the pressures management faces from both
the market for its services (the managerial-labor market) and the market for
the firm's products or services (the product market)8 2 Managers compete
with each other for obtaining higher positions and salaries within a firm and
between firms. If managers are slack on the job or are taking too many per-
quisites, then the market for their services may penalize them by retarding
their career growth, providing them with smaller salaries and power and
83perhaps even resulting in their dismissal . The threat of these negative con-
sequences might help to provide managers with additional incentives to
work hard.
Similarly, the product market acts as a constraint on managers. If man-
agers are slack, then their firms' products are likely to be inferior and may
lose out to other competing products, thereby making their firm less profit-
able. Such firms may then pay their managers less or dismiss them from
their jobs (e.g., as a result of a takeover triggered by dropping share
814prices). Both the labor and product markets "incentivize" managers to
work hard by relying on future opportunities (e.g., for managerial positions
and promotions) as a prize that managers chase after. However, there may be
certain instances of managerial misbehavior in which (1) the gains are so
substantial that managers are willing to sacrifice future opportunities, (2) the
markets do not register certain kinds of slack, or (3) that slack is common-
place.5 In these instances something more may be needed to constrain
managerial behavior.
One option is to align the incentives of management and shareholders by
adjusting their contract (e.g., increase management's share of profits to
twenty-five percent). However, one can only go so far in adding contractual
details. The reason is that contracting is not costless, and the parties may not
be able to foresee every future contingency.16 Thus, it will be efficient for
81. See id.; see also ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 79, at 3-12.
82. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 94-98. For a discussion in the context of
a specific case, see Krishna Palepu & Tarun Khanna, Product and Labor Market Globalization &
Convergence of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Infosys and the Indian Software Industry,
(Harvard Univ. Negotiation, Org. & Mkts., Working Paper No. 02-30, 2001), available at
http://ssrn.corn/abstract=323142.
83. See EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 79, at 94-98.
84. See id.
85. See id. Concerns with end-of-period frauds are well known. See Cindy R. Alexander
et al., Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public
Firms, 42 J.L. & ECON. 393, 395, 404 (1999).
86. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 90-92; see Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6726,
1998), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=226378.
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there to be some gaps in the contract between the parties. In this situation,
fiduciary duties, such as the duty of loyalty, duty of care, and duty of good
faith, can be particularly valuable as gap-filling mechanisms.87 The question
then becomes, what might the literature on managerial duties tell us about
the kinds of duties, if any, that should attach to corporate monitors?
b. Fiduciary Duties for Monitors?
To examine the potential duties for influential monitors, we utilize the
following hypothetical. Assume that monitors do not receive a share of the
firm's profits but are paid in some more fixed manner. Indeed, this is the
norm given that the raison d'etre for monitors is usually to ensure the firm
complies with the law rather than to ensure the firm makes profits. Second,
assume that there are a number of business projects or strategies that a firm
can choose to follow and they have differing likelihoods of violating the law
and differing levels of profitability. To stylize the example further, assume a
company is considering two strategies-A (generating $10 million in prof-
its) and B (generating $50 million in profits). Third, assume that in fact both
strategies have little risk of violating the law, but it is costly to determine
this-assume it requires $2 million of effort to determine A's compliance
risk and $4 million to determine B's compliance risk. This may be due to
uncertainty in the law or simply due to difficulty in understanding what the
strategy entails. Shareholders will clearly prefer B, but what will the moni-
tor prefer?
If the monitor is paid a fixed fee per year, then he will prefer the strategy
that is lower cost to him (e.g., the strategy for which ascertaining its legality
and/or payoffs is cheaper for the monitor). In our example, the monitor will
prefer A (because it is less costly to determine its legality) even though
shareholders (and social welfare) would prefer B. If, on the other hand, the
monitor's cost of inquiry are covered by the firm, then he will investigate
both A and B. This could lead him to choose B, which is desirable. How-
ever, when the monitor bears none of the costs of his inquiry, he may engage
in too much inquiry (e.g., spend $100 million inquiring into A, B, and other
87. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 90-92. Indeed, fiduciary duties were
conceived of as gap-filling measures in the early economic literature. See id. More recently, a
greater focus has developed on notions of trust and fiduciary duty. See Tamar Frankel, Trusting and
Non-Trusting: Comparing Benefits, Cost and Risk (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Work-
ing Paper Series, Paper No. 99-12, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=214588; Edward L.
Glaeser et al., What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness 3 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7216, 1999), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
171073. However, for our purposes the standard gap-filling account will suffice. This is because the
standard account is probably less likely to provide fiduciary duty protection than trust-based ac-
counts. If we can show that fiduciary duties are desired even under the more miserly gap-filling




strategies that do not generate commensurate profits)." His incentives are
still not optimal.
Indeed, one expects that hourly rate or fixed fee compensation structures
are likely to lead to a divergence in the incentives of monitors and share-
holders. One could try more creative compensation structures (e.g., options
or hybrid hourly rates), but as we have seen in the recent past, that is also
wrought with its own problems. s9 One could also attempt to address the in-
centive divergence through the use of fiduciary duties, but before doing that,
let us examine whether there are market forces (i.e., labor and product mar-
kets) that could at least partially address our concerns.
The influential monitors may not face the same kinds of labor market
forces as managers. First, monitors do not appear to be appointed because of
a belief in their ability to generate great profits (through legal means) but
rather the perception that they can help the firm prevent future law viola-
tions. Second, monitors cannot be easily replaced (as suggested by most
DPAs), which implies that the penalty for poor performance is unlikely to be
dismissal. Thus, monitors face considerably less ongoing labor market pres-
sures as compared to managers.90.
The other primary market force would be product market competition,
but the same factors that reduced the effects of the labor market reduce the
effects of the product market. For example, even if the firm is failing, moni-
tors cannot be easily replaced. Indeed, even if the firm is taken over by
another entity, that may not terminate the monitoring arrangement. Of
course, it is easy to understand why most DPAs or NPAs do not permit an
acquisition to terminate the monitoring arrangement because otherwise that
would provide the firm with a reason to sell itself-to get around the moni-
tor.9' Nonetheless, a corollary of this is that it is more difficult to displace
monitors than managers, and hence they face lesser incentives than manag-
ers to maximize profits.
Finally, one might argue that the possibility of future monitoring as-
signments, which are valuable to monitors, may induce monitors to focus on
maximizing profits. This depends both on what factors drive the choice of a
monitor and on the efficacy of the reputational market for monitors' ser-
vices. Given that monitors (even the influential ones) are chosen primarily
for their expertise in law compliance, one would not expect their ability to
88. Cf Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1028, 1046-48 (1982) (discussing how there may be too much search activity in certain con-
texts).
89. There is a vast literature on this. For an overview, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005).
90. Of course, it is possible that the selection method for monitors tends to select those peo-
ple who have good incentives and hence will probably perform well. However, this depends on
one's confidence in the selection method. If it is based on agencies screening for those people with
considerable business and legal experience, then we might have faith in the choice, but if it is based
on prior connections to the agency, then one may view things differently. Indeed, if all monitors
appear to have government connections, then the system risks a criticism of cronyism. Currently,
almost all monitors have prior agency connections.
91. If this were not the case, it would be an obvious loophole for firms to exploit.
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generate profits to significantly influence their chances at receiving future
monitoring assignments. Thus, it is not clear that the market will focus
much on the profit-maximizing aspect of a monitor.92 Second, if monitoring
assignments are limited primarily to former government officials, then one
might be concerned that the reputational market may not be driven so much
by ability to ensure compliance as prior connections to the agency bringing
the enforcement action.
Given that market forces may not induce influential monitors to focus on
maximizing profits, there appears to be a role for some supplementaryS93
measures such as fiduciary duties. There are a number of options one
might consider. First, one could develop fiduciary duties for monitors. Sec-
ond, one could draft DPAs more carefully-specifying what the monitor's
duties and powers are. Third, the appointing agency could have some super-
visory role over monitors. Of course, one could rely on some combination
of these features as well. Indeed, it is a combination that we think in the end
may best suit the goals of having monitors involved, as each option has
strengths and weaknesses and together they may complement each other.
c. Suggestions for Reform for Influential Monitors
We begin with recommending greater specificity in the DPA about the
tasks and powers of monitors. Greater specificity will aid in guiding moni-
tors in determining how they, and the monitee, should act. Indeed, a number
of the monitors we spoke to (and our own assessment of the DPAs) sug-
gested that greater specificity would be very desirable. Second, more clarity
in the DPA will help in evaluating how monitors are performing. After all,
when there are clearer and more verifiable goals, assessment becomes eas-
ier. Additional clarity will also help in developing a reputational market for
monitors that will consider profitability as a factor and will aid in allowing
people to compare how monitors performed. Both of these help to incentiv-
ize monitors and reduce the need for further judicial oversight (such as
92. This might simply be a temporary phenomenon. If more monitoring assignments involve
the influential type of monitor, then a reputational market may develop to address profit maximizing
ability, too. However, one has not yet developed, and even if it did, monitors would still face lesser
market pressures than managers who could be fired as well as face reputational losses.
93. It is noteworthy that the foregoing discussion suggests that monitors face even less mar-
ket pressure than managers to maximize profits (e.g., it is so difficult to replace a monitor). This
may lead one to impose additional scrutiny on monitors relative to managers (i.e., even stronger
fiduciary duties on monitors than managers). However, we must be careful at this juncture. It may
be that the pressure to maximize profits in part led management to consider the illegal acts in the
first place (depending on the type of illegal act). See Cindy R. Alexander & Marc A. Cohen, New
Evidence on the Origins of Corporate Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421 (1996). After
all, some management may be trying so hard to maximize profits that they "push the envelope" too
far. We stress "some" management because "pushing the envelope" does not describe the more
recent kinds of fraud which smack more of outright theft (e.g., WorldCom). If this is correct, then
one way to reduce the amount of illegal behavior is to remove (or reduce) the pressure to maximize
profits. Difficult-to-displace monitors assessed on their law compliance abilities may achieve that
aim. However, that does not mean we should do nothing to motivate monitors to make profit-
maximizing decisions (legally) for the firm. In light of this, we are inclined to suggest that some
supplement to market forces is necessary (e.g., fiduciary duties).
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fiduciary duties). Of course, more careful DPA drafting cannot eradicate all
concerns (because a completely contingent contract is unlikely), but it will
prove useful to reduce some concerns. In light of that, we consider the fol-
lowing to be features that should be carefully considered and clearly
delineated in a DPA: (1) the scope of the monitor's duties, written in a man-
ner that minimizes interpretation, and the goals of their assignment; (2) the
authority granted to and the roles to be played by each party; (3) the report-
ing chain between the monitor and, for example, the monitee, its board, its
audit committee, its general counsel, the government, etc., as well as be-
tween the monitee and the government; (4) the expectations among the
parties regarding whether the monitor's work is to be privileged; (5) the
termination of the monitoring arrangement and what happens in case of ac-
quisition; and (6) for more influential monitors, the liability of monitors to
third parties for certain business decisions (e.g., corporate torts or crimes).
However, even with these terms, we still expect there to be considerable
room for dispute and negotiation (and renegotiation). In light of this, we
also recommend that there be a mechanism for referral back to the appoint-
ing agency to resolve certain key disputes between the monitor and the firm.
If there is still some slack (as we expect there will be), then we suggest a
combination of fiduciary duties and a little more monitoring by the appoint-
ing agency. This is in essence a question of which arm of the government
should monitor the monitors. Reliance on fiduciary duty places courts as the
monitor of monitors, whereas agency monitoring places the agency as the
monitor of monitors. Both have certain advantages-agencies have expertise
in the area where the wrongdoing occurred and in crafting rules and regula-
tions, but courts have more experience with fiduciary duties and ex post
standard-based decision-making." Thus, if one is monitoring the monitor to
ensure that the firm is complying with the law, perhaps the agency may be
more useful. However, if one is trying to ensure that monitors are at least
attempting to make profit-maximizing decisions for the corporation and its
shareholders (as is the case with standard fiduciary duty analysis), then the
courts may be better positioned.
94. This is when it becomes imperative that the monitor possess the requisite expertise to
render his or her own independent judgment as to what is required, no more and no less, to fulfill the
mandate set out in the disposition, and be able and willing to exercise that judgment in the face of
criticism by both the firm and the government. For the process to work with its greatest integrity,
discussions of work scope should be left to the monitor with an open door for either the government
or the firm to complain to the judge if things get totally out of hand. Fortunately for the monitor, he
or she can withdraw if necessary to protect his or her own integrity, but chances are that the moni-
tor's wishes will, in the end, be honored. No monitor has been replaced as yet, and the occasional
challenges to the monitor's authority are usually resolved in favor of the monitor by the agency.
95. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992) (discussing optimal choice between rules and standards); Edward L Glaeser & Andrei
Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No.
1934, 2001), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=290287 (comparing and analyzing court and
agency enforcement; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Defendants and the Protections of Crimi-
nal Procedure: An Economic Analysis (Univ. of Mich. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Paper




Even if agencies might do a tolerably good job of watching monitors to
maximize profits, we may have a few further concerns with solely relying
96on agencies. First, one of the reasons for having monitors might be to re-
duce enforcement burdens and costs for agencies so that they can focus their
resources on bringing enforcement actions rather than monitoring firms.
This places something of a constraint on how much monitoring the agency
can sensibly undertake without sacrificing one of the benefits of having
monitors. 9' Second, given that most of the monitors are former enforcement
officials (no doubt capitalizing on their considerable law compliance experi-
ence), it might prove advantageous to have a nonagency official with some
oversight to help provide a broader view of the functioning of the more in-
fluential monitors.
In light of this, we suggest some oversight by the appointing agency for
most monitors. For more influential monitors, we suggest additional over-
sight through fiduciary duty analysis by courts. As with managers, we would
suggest duties of loyalty, care, and good faith. These duties could be en-
forced by shareholder suits, but, given the concerns with frivolous suits,9s we
would suggest tight limits on them (e.g., by requiring the largest willing
shareholder to choose counsel and post bonds), application of the business-
judgment rule for monitor's business decisions, 99 the purchase of directors'
and officers' insurance policies, and indemnification for monitors. °°
2. Monitors More Akin to Advisors
The discussion so far has focused on the more influential monitors, °' but
many monitors have more limited roles. To the extent that monitors occupy
a more limited role (e.g., those without the ability to fire employees or make
96. Government agencies have been placed as the monitors of private businesses in other
countries and to an extent in the United States, too (for corporate probation officers). These have not
been failures nor have they necessarily been complete successes. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatiza-
tion and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1
(1999) (discussing securities markets regulation in Poland and the Czech Republic and use of gov-
ernment monitors); Wray, supra note 62, at 2039.
97. Thus, agency monitoring may not occupy more than de minimis oversight of monitors.
98. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
99. We believe many of the concerns animating the business judgment rule apply in the
context of monitors-risk aversion on directors' behalf and judicial-hindsight bias in particular. See
ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 79, at 251-53. Another matter supporting the business judgment
rule for managers is that managers (compared to shareholders) are less able to diversify their firm-
specific risk because they cannot work at many different firms at once, whereas shareholders can
invest in different firms. We consider monitors better able than managers to diversify firm-specific
risk because they can take on more than one monitoring assignment at a time and often have other
jobs with which they are involved. However, we still consider their ability to diversify risk to be less
than that of shareholders and hence consider the business judgment rule to be the appropriate liabil-
ity screen.
100. The monitor might negotiate with the government or the firm for either insurance or, if
the monitor is an attorney, additional malpractice insurance.
101. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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operational decisions), we do not think the analysis in Section 1 applies in
full.
It is a core feature of fiduciary duty analysis that the extent of the duties
depends on the extent of the vulnerability of the principal to the fiduciary.' °2
When monitors are advisors, they have a much more indirect effect on prof-
itability. They are more akin to attorneys or consultants advising the firm
about various options the firm is considering. These kinds of monitors do
not have as much of a say in firm profitability as the more influential moni-
tors and hence cannot be analogized to managers as easily.
This does not, however, mean that no duties should be imposed on these
monitors but simply that different kinds of fiduciary duties need to be con-
sidered. For these monitors, the concern is not that they will not maximize
profits (they do not have the power to do so) but that they will not provide
the best advice they can on compliance. Here market forces do provide
greater assurances than they might for the more influential monitors. This is
because the reputational market for monitors depends on how good the
monitor is at ensuring compliance. If the monitor is not good at this task,
then he is unlikely to receive future monitoring assignments. Indeed, given
the currently small number of monitors, the reputational market may work
rather well for the issue of compliance because it is easier to assign credit
and blame, and the players may know each other better than if there were
many more monitors in the market. Indeed, one advantage of appointing
former enforcement officials as monitors is that the agencies already have
experience with these officials, making a reputational assessment somewhat
easier.
Although the reputational market works better for these monitors, the
labor and product markets face the same concerns-the inability to replace a
monitor hampers both. However, for these more limited monitors, the mar-
ket for their regular professions (e.g., legal services) may operate as a check.
If someone considered an expert on securities fraud provides poor advice to
a firm he is monitoring, then that person's market prospects for advising
others on securities fraud (as an attorney) would suffer.
For these reasons as well as the monitor's inability to directly influence
profits, we do not think that a fiduciary duty to maximize profits would be
optimal here. Instead, we would suggest a fiduciary duty akin to that of at-
torneys or any professional to their client. Indeed, monitors currently are
treated essentially as attorneys for the firms they are monitoring. This sim-
ply reflects the primary role that monitors have played until now as
advisors. In addition to these kinds of fiduciary duties, we would suggest
that better drafting of the DPA or NPA and somewhat greater agency over-
sight may prove helpful in aligning interests and clarifying the scope of the
monitoring assignment.
102. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 90-92.
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D. Back to the Past?: Comparison with Professional
Director Recommendations
Although corporate monitors are a relatively new part of enforcement,
they bear considerable similarity to reform suggestions proffered in the past.
In particular, Professors Gilson and Kraakman have suggested the creation
of a market for professional, independent directors who could serve as
monitors of corporate performance.' Their idea was that professional, in-
dependent directors might be elected by institutional investors to monitor
management at firms. ° These directors would be essentially full-time direc-
tors at half a dozen or so firms and could be selected from a pool of
directors through a central clearinghouse.' 5 Because these directors would
be selected by institutional investors, they would be both independent of
management and dependent on shareholders.' ° When this practice is com-
bined with the presence of a market for their services, one would expect
there to be good incentives to monitor.) 7 Further, as these directors would
serve full time on a handful of boards, we would expect them to have more
time to monitor and perhaps to have better access to information about the
firm than most current outside directors.
'°
0
Although their proposal has not yet led to the creation of such a market
through any organized means, we are struck by some of the parallels to the
"organic" development of corporate monitors.'09 In particular, monitors are
independent of management, have considerable time to monitor the firm,
and have access to considerable information. Indeed, monitors frequently
have considerably greater access to information (and the power to compel
more) than professional directors might under the Gilson and Kraakman
proposal." ° All these features make corporate monitors rather good moni-
tors. Moreover, they are not appointed or nominated by management.
The primary differences we see are that monitors (1) are not currently
beholden to shareholders, (2) are appointed by a government agency rather
than shareholders, and (3) are appointed only when some alleged wrongdo-
ing has occurred (as opposed to always being present as in the Gilson and
Kraakman proposal). However, if our reform proposals are accepted, then
monitors would owe some fiduciary duties to shareholders. Thus, the pri-
103. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda
for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 883-92 (1991).
104. Id. at 879-92.
105. Id. at 885-87.
106. Id. at 886.
107. Id. at 889-90.
108. Id. at 885, 890.
109. We use the term "organic" to capture the idea that monitors were not implemented
through any organized means but rather came about through a series of settlements.
110. This was a concern that Gilson and Kraakman address in some measure. Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 103, at 889-90.
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mary differences remaining are who appoints the monitor (government ver-
sus shareholders) and the trigger for their appointment.
One might view the government agency as akin to a central clearing-
house of sorts for monitors as they become the repositories for information
on the monitor and their effectiveness. Of course, the government agency's
incentives and those of a central clearinghouse may not be the same, but one
can conceptualize the agency as serving a similar information-gathering or
information-disseminating role."'
However, the comparison to professional directors provides yet another
potential reform. One way to align the interests of the influential monitors
with those of shareholders is to give shareholders a greater say in who is
appointed to be the monitor. Perhaps institutional investors could have some
greater, explicit voice in this process by, for example, being consulted by the
government agency before appointing a monitor. This would not only make
monitors more responsive to shareholder concerns but also would make ad-
dressing shareholder concerns something that is reflected in the reputation
of monitors and in the market for their services. This would further help to
align monitors' and shareholders' interests in those cases in which monitors
could exercise considerable influence over firm profitability.
Finally, monitors are currently limited only to situations where some al-
leged wrongdoing has occurred. ' 2 Although this is different from the
proposal suggested by Gilson and Kraakman, one might still conceive of it
as a first step in the general direction towards such professional directors.
Indeed, monitors could be viewed as a test case for a core of professional
directors. Although we do not speculate about the likely future development
of monitors and how it may dovetail with a market for professional direc-
tors, we find the parallels both striking and instructive. We await future
developments with bated breath.
CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, enforcement authorities have increasingly relied
upon corporate monitors to help ensure law compliance and reduce the
number of future violations. In this paper we describe the development and
common features of corporate monitors as well as examine when monitors
are desirable and what obligations they should bear.
We find that monitoring arrangements are becoming more common and
their powers are expanding. Monitors possess a wide range of powers that
can be aligned along a continuum of being very influential (almost running
the firm) to being significant advisors. In light of this, our analysis examines
the desirability of monitors along this continuum. We conclude that moni-
tors should be used only in certain instances (e.g., when socially cheaper
sanctions are not sufficient for deterrence). When they are used, some fidu-
111. In particular, one might be concerned about the factors that go into a government
agency's decision to appoint monitors (especially if most are former government officials).
112. See supra Part III.
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ciary duties should apply to them. The extent and nature of these fiduciary
duties should vary to reflect the degree of vulnerability of shareholders to
the monitor's decisions. Thus, for the more influential monitors, we suggest
broader fiduciary duties than for the more advisor-like monitors. We also
provide a number of recommendations that should help to enhance the per-
formance of monitors. In some respects, if influential monitors do not owe
some duties to the shareholders whose assets they are monitoring, then they
become like czars-people with considerable, but largely unfettered, power.
Finally, we compare the corporate monitor to a reform proposal for cre-
ating a core of professional directors and find a number of similarities. It
appears that government enforcement authorities have been creating, in a
piecemeal and organic manner, something like a market for professional
supervisors. The experiences with monitors may then be quite instructive for
future governance developments. Whether the development of monitors will
morph over time into a market for professional directors is something that
corporate governance scholars and practitioners will likely be anxiously
watching.
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APPENDIX
CRITICAL FEATURES OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND
No PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS AT THE
FEDERAL LEVEL SINCE I 9 9 3 f
AIG (2004) AmSouth (2004) AOL (2004)
Charges Aiding and abetting Failing tofile suspicious activity reports in a Aiding and abetting securities fraud.
securities fraud, timely, complete, and accurate manner.
Agency U.S. Department of U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal
Justice, Criminal Division, Division, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Division, U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Fraud Section. Southern District of Mississippi. Eastern District of Virginia.
Fines $40 million in tines; silent as to restitution. $60 million in tines; $150 million i
restitution.
Duration 12 months 12 months 24 months
Extension 12 months comply and Monitor may extend period of review up
Option agreement xpires after to 6 months with DOJ approval.
24 months.
Monitor No. No. Name not publicly available.
How selected Mutually agreed upon by the Department
of Justice and AOL.
Supervised By Makes a report to the Audit and Finance
Committee, with a copy to DOJ; makes
recommendations o Audit and Finance
Committee.
Duties o Special review of the effectiveness of
AOL's internal control mnesures related
to its accounting for advertising and
related transactions, thetraining related
to these internal control measures,
AOL's deal sign-off and approval
procedures, and AOL's corporate code
of conduct.
Frequency of Reports to On at least a semiannual basis as to
Government cooperation from AOL.
Funding Retained and paid by AOL; monitor has







Post-Monitor Obligations 1(4 survives indefinitely.
This Appendix contains information from a number of sources. For citations to the
DPAs/NPAs involving AIG-FP Pagic Equity Holding Corp.; AmSouth Bancorporation; America
Online Inc.; Aurora Foods, Inc.; Bank of New York; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.; Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce; Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc.; InVision Techs., Inc.; KPMG; Merrill Lynch &
Co.; Micrus Corp. & Micrus S.A.; Monsanto Co.; N.Y. Racing Ass'n; Prudential Sec. Inc.; and
Symbol Tech., see Corporate Crime Reporter, supra note 1. For citations to the other DPAs/NPAs
see Consent Agreement between Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State and The
Boeing Co. (March 28, 2006), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.comdocuments/
boeingsettle.pdf; Diagnostic Prod. Corp., supra note 30; Letter from Alice H. Martin, U.S. Attorney
for the N. Dist. of Ala., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Robert S. Bennett, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom LLP, counsel to HealthSouth Corp., supra note 39; HVB Letter, supra note 29; Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Roger Williams Med. Ctr., supra note 39; Deferred Prose-
cution Agreement, United States v. SSI Int'l Far East, supra note 30; Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, S.E.C. v. Titan Corp., No. 1:05cv00411 (D. D.C. March 30, 2005); Statoil,
ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54599 (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/adminl/2006/34-54599.pdf.
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Aurora Foods, Inc. (2001) Bank of New York (2005)
Charges Admission of false and U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York
misleading statements and Aiding and abetting fraudulent activities of subsidiary by executing sham escrow
omissions in connection with agreements; willfully failing to file Suspicious Activity Reports in a timely
Aurora's financial statements and manner; and failure to notify authorities as required by law.
public filings with the SEC. DPA U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York
is silent on specific charges. Aiding and abetting the operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business;
aiding and abetting the unlawful operation of a foreign bank; failure to implement
an effective anti-money laundering program, as required by law; and engaging
in money laundering.
Agency U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Offices for the Eastern and
Criminal Division. Southern Districts of New York with the Internal Revenue Service and Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Fines Silent as to fines; silent as to $26 million in fines; $12 million in restitution.
restitution.
Duration 36 months
Extension U.S. Attorney's Office may terminate if purposes of agreement have been fully
Option achieved and further monitoring is no longer required. 6 and 7 are permanent
with regard to conduct covered by DPA.
Monitor George A. Stamboulidis, Baker Hostetler, New York, NY.
How selected Aurora must retain a mutually Applications submitted to U.S. Attorney's Office; after considering views of, inter
acceptable outside consultant. aia, BNY, U.S. Attorney's Office will select monitor.
Supervised By Delivers reports to General Counsel, who must present to Board and Audit
Committee for review.
Duties , Advise Aurora regarding an • Review BNY's SAR practices and procedures; anti-money laundering
appropriate compliance program. procedures; and BNY's implementation of and compliance with the DPA and the
remedial actions prescribed in it.
Frequency of Semi-annual basis; monitor may file additional reports with BNY's General
Reports to Counsel or, without notice to BNY, with U.S. Attorney's Office.
Government
Funding "BNY agrees to pay all costs associated with the retention of [monitor] for these
purposes." 112.
Resolution of Any refusal by BNY or its agents to render full cooperation to the monitor will




Internal Changes Board Management
Required Appoint two independent and ° New senior-level position in Legal Division called Head of Law Enforcement
outside directors, including one to and Investigations. 10(b).
serve on audit committee to ° Creation of Suspicious Activity Response Team. 1 100).
oversee implementation of ° New management committee headed by BNY's president to review actions of
compliance program. 67 involved employees. I I0(a).
Management Internal investigations
, Appoint a compliance officer to ° Hired Sullivan & Cromwell, results shared with U.S. Attorney's Office and
oversee the implementation of the attomey-client privilege waived with regard to report. 1 6.
compliance program.
Post-Monitor Board Management
Obligations , Appoint two independent and * New senior-level position in Legal Division called Head of Law Enforcement
outside directors, including one to and Investigations. I 10(b).
serve on audit committee to ° Creation of Suspicious Activity Response Team. 100).
oversee implementation of • New management committee headed by BNY's president to review actions of
compliance program. 67 involved employees. 10(a).
Management
, Appoint a compliance officer to
oversee the implementation of the
compliance program.
1746 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:1713
Boeing (2003) Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (2005)
Charges Unauthorized exports of a defense article. Conspiracy to commit securities fraud.
Agency U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Directorate of Trade Controls, Office of Defense Trade District of New Jersey.
Controls Compliance.
Fines $15 million ("civil penalty"); silent on restitution. $100 million in fines; $839 million in restitution.
Duration 36 months 24 months
Extension Minimum two years followed by an individual from inside
Option corporation for 1 year and report o SVP, Office of Internal
Govemance, and DTCC.
Monitor Hon. Frederick B. Lacey, LeBoeuf Lamb, New York, NY.
How selected Boeing to appoint a qualified individual from outside the Previously retained by BMS.
corporation as monitor. Monitor forsakes for all time any future
employment or representation. Subject o approval of DTCC.
Supervised By Senior officers receive copies of reports to DTCC, reports may No one. Monitor shall "have authority to require BMS to take
include input or comments from Boeing's VP, Global Trade any steps he believes are necessary to comply with ... this
Controls. Agreement." 12(a).
Duties , Monitor Boeing's ITAR export compliance program, oversee • Continue the review, reforms, and other functions
implementation f DPA, and monitor all AECAIITAR-regulated undertaken as Independent Advisor.
activities of Boeing. - Cooperate with SEC, monitor BMS's compliance, and make
recommendations ecessary to ensure that the company
complies with applicable securities laws.
- Monitor BMS's compliance with agreements in other actions,
and monitor information received by the confidential botine
and e-mail address.
- Meet quarterly with CEO, non-executive Chairman, and
General Counsel.
Frequency of Reports every 90 days for first six months, semi-annually At least on a quarterly basis and between 30 and 45 days
Reports to thereafter. after filing of 10-K for FY2006. 12(c).
Government
Funding "[Plrofessional staff as are reasonably necessary ... upto two
full-time equivalents." 12(l) of annex.
Resolution of May present any disagreement up through management chain "BMS shall adopt all recommendations contained in each
disagreements/m from BCA to Boeing CEO and eventually DTCC. report submitted by the Monitor to the [U.S. Attorey's Office
onitor's authority unless EMS objects ... and the Office agrees.. .. T 14.
Replacement Boeing's SVP may recommend a successor, Boeings "ilt the Monitor esigns or is unable to serve for the balance of
Provision Corporate VP, Contracts & Pricing, may fill in on temporary his term, a successor shall be selected by BMS and approved
basis, by the [U.S. Attorney's] Office within forty-five (45) days." 16.
Internal Changes Management Board
Required • Create a senior management position repotng to VP Global o Appoint an additional, non-exaecutive Director acceptable to
Trade Controls, Office of Internal Governance, with duties to the U.S. Attorney's Office.
include "ensuring application of best practices across the • Establish the position of non-executive Chairman of the BMS
corporation [ ot limited to measures required by agreementr. Board of Directors, to be retained at least through the term of
T 2 of annex. Also file annual reports with Directorate of Trade the agreement, who can require reports on any subject from
Controls. Meets quarterly with monitor for duration of DPA. any officer or employee of the Company. ) 10.
lnternalinvestigations
- BCA to retain an outside firm to conduct audit of
implementation f the DPA and assess the overall
effectiveness of BCA's compliance programs no later than 18
months after signing order.
"Required to audit of affiliates for three years prior to DPA.
"Within 30 months, report from senior compliance manager on
audit findings. DPA silent on who report goes to.
Post-Monitor Management Board
Obligations "As under "Intemal Changes Required". " Appoint an additional, non-executive Director acceptable to
the U.S. Attorney's Office.
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Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (2003) Computer Associates International, Inc. (2004)
Charges DPA describes violations of Financial Accounting Securities fraud and obstruction of justice.
Standards, but does not name specific charges.
Agency U.S. Department of Justice, Enron Task Force; U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Eastern District of New York.
Fines $80 million in fines; silent as to restitution. Silent as to fines; $225 million in restitution; $163 million in
stock to settle civil suits.
Duration 36 months 18 months
Extension Longer of 18 months or until such time as reforms have been
Option substantially implemented for two successive quarters.
Monitor Michael G. Considine, Day Berry & Howard LLP, Lee S. Richards 1i, Richards Kibbe & Orbe LLP,
New York, NY. New York, NY.
How selected Selected by DOJ and acceptable to CIBC. Within 30 days, CA must submit list of five candidates, U.S.
Attorney's Office will approve three candidates, and then court
will pick one.
Supervised By Primarily CIBC.
Duties Enron Task Force Monitor * Examine CA's compliance with agreement; make
-Monitor CIBC's compliance with agreement, recommendations to the Board for review and implementation;
relying, where needed, on judgment of Monitor and and conduct comprehensive review of following areas:
outside Monitor named under agreement with -CA's practices for the recognition of software license
CIBC, OSFI, and the Federal Reserve (FR). revenue;
- Coordinate with SEC, FR, and OSFI. -CA's internal accounting controls and implementation of
Federal Reserve Auditor an improved ERP information technology system;
- Assist in monitoring CIBS's compliance with, and - CA's internal audit department;
effectiveness of, policies and procedures and any - CA's ethics and compliance policies; and
enhancements or revisions thereto. CA's records management policies and procedures.
-Within 30 days of Agreement, submit a written
plan detailing how Auditor intends to monitor
CIBC's compliance with policies and procedures.
- Report in writing any non-compliance by CIBC.
Frequency of Semi-annual basis as to CIBC's compliance with Quarterly. Within six months of appointment, issue report








Internal Changes Management Board
Required -CIBC must create a new Financial Transaction • Add Laura Unger and two more independent directors to the
Oversight Committee to review quarter-end and board and establish a Compliance Committee of the Board.
year-end transactions. 5, Fed Agreement 12.
Appendix. Management
-Appoint an independent, senior-level Chief Compliance
Officer (CCO), after consultation with U.S. Attorney's Office,
that will report directly to the Board Compliance Committee
and General Counsel. 14.
-Establish a new Disclosure Committee composed of CEO,
COO, CFO, CCO, CAO, and General Counsel.
- Reorganize Internal Audit Department, hiring at least five
more internal auditors. 15.
- Develop plan to ensure effectiveness of communications with
governmental agencies engaged in inquiries on CA. T 16.
Internal investigations
' Retained Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Pricewaterhouse
Coopers, 5, and shared findings with charging agencies.
Investigation and expectation of shared results continuing.
Post-Monitor Management Upon expiration of Agreement, CA will continue to fulfill the
Obligations , CIBC must create a new Financial Transaction cooperation obligations in 16. Cooperation not required in
Oversight Committee to review quarter-end and proceedings where CA is a defendant. q 7.
year-end transactions. Fed Agreement Appendix, Board & Management
5. -As in "Internal Changes Required".
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Diagnostic Products Corp. (2005) Heathsouth Corp. (2006)
Charges Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act DPA silent on actual charges, but incorporates SEC v. Healthsouth
of 1977. Corp., No. CV-03-J-0615-S (N.D. Ala.), which charges falsification of
financial statements, false and misleading SEC filings, and violations
of the FCPA.
Agency Securities and Exchange Commission. U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section; U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Alabama.
Fines $2.3 million in fines; silent as to restitution. $103 million in fines; $445 million in restitution.
Duration 36 months
Extension Expires November 17,2009
Option
Monitor
How selected DPC shall retain a qualified independent Selected by audit committee and "shall be licensed as a certified
compliance consultant not unacceptable to the public accountant. 111.
'SEC.
Supervised By Audit committee; audit committee also sets compensation.
Duties o Review annually DPC's compliance with its • Shall be charged with reporting any indications of violations of law
FCPA policies and procedures, and make or of HealthSouth's procedures, insofar as they are relevant to the
recommendations, duties of the Audit Committee, to the Audit Committee. Copies of
these reports shall be submitted to the government for three years.
Frequency of Annually, with first report within 90 days of Only when reporting violations of law or procedures of audit.
Reports to appointment.
Government
Funding DPC ... shall compensate the Compliance Healthouth shall permit the Inspector General to hire a staff of at
Consultant, and persons engaged to assist the least five people.
Compliance Consultant, for services rendered
.. at their reasonable and customary rates
Resolution of The company is not required to adopt any of
disagreements/ the changes contained in the monitor's report:
monitor's "In the event a Report contains any
authority recommendation for further action by DPC,
within 90 days after receiving the Report,
DPC's Board of Directors shall advise [the
SEC], in writing, of all decisions and
determinations it has made as a result of the
Report." 11.
Replacement "OPC (i) shall not have the authority to
Provision terminate the Compliance Consultant without
the prior written approval of the majority of
DPC's independent board members and the
[SEC].... "p. 4, 13.
Internal None. The company is not required to adopt Board
Changes any of the changes contained in the monitor's , Adopted transition plan resulting in addition of nine new individuals
Required report: 'In the event a Report contains any to Board.
recommendation for further action by DPC, , New charters for audit-related and governance-reated committees
within 90 days after receiving the Report, af the board.
DPC's Board of Directors shall advise [the Management
SEC], in writing, of all decisions and * Cleaned house regarding upper management.
determinations it has made as a result of the
Report. p. 4, 1.
Post-Monitor Board
Obligations , Adopted transition plan resulting in addition of nine new individuals
to Board.
, New charters for audit-related and govemance-related committees
of the board.
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HVB Rtsk Management and HVB U.S. (2006) InVialon Technotogles, Inc. (2004)
Charges Conspiracy to defraud the U.S. and the IRS, tax Bribing foreign officials to retain business in Thailand, China,
evasion, and fraudulent tax returns, and the Philippines, and failure to monitor foreign sales activity
for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Agency U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section.
for the Southern District of New York.
Fines $22,645,801 in fines; $6,989,324 in restitution to $800,000 and a fine to the SEC to be decided; silent as to
the IRS. restitution.
Duration 18 months 18 months
Extension Monitorship lasts 18 months; agreement expires in 24 months.
Option May be extended by an additional 6 months if DOJ deems
necessary.
Monitor No Bill Pendergast, Paul Hastings, Washington, DC.
How selected Selected and paid for by InVision and approved by DOJ.
Supervised By
Duties 'The Monitor shall:
(a) monitor InVision's compliance with this Agreement;
(b) monitor InVision's implementation of and adherence to
policies and procedures relating to FCPA compliance...;
(c) ensure that the Policies and Procedues are appropriately
designed to accomplish their goals; ... and
(a) coordinate with the SEC and provide information about
InVision as requested by that agency." T 12.
Frequency of On at least a semi-annual basis and between 30 and 45 days
Reports to before the end of Monitor's term.
Government
Funding
Resolution of No changes to FCPA compliance policies and procedures
disagreementstm without monitor's approval. InVision's knowingly or wilfully
onitor's authority failing to perform the duties imposed by Monitor permits U.S.




Required • HVB shall maintain a permanent compliance
office, and maintain a compliance and ethics
program.
-HVB shall take steps to audit the compliance and
ethics program to ensure it is carrying out the
duties and responsibilities set forth in this
agreement.
Post-Monitor No monitor. However, after termination of
Obligations agreement HVB's obligation to cooperate is not
intended to apply in the event that a prosecution
against HVB is pursued and not deferred.
Management
-HVB shalt maintain a permanent compliance
office, and maintain a compliance and ethics
program.
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KPMG (2005) Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (2003)
Charges Participating in a conspiracy to defraud the U.S. DPA is silent as to actual charges deferred, but prosecuting
and IRS, tax evasion, and making fraudulent tax office agrees to "not prosecute Merrill Lynch for any crimes
returns. committed by its employees relating to the Year-End 1999
Transactions." 3.
Agency U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Enron Task Force.
Fraud Section, U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York.
Fines $228 million in fines; $228 million in restitution to Silent as to fines; silent as to restitution. Contra CIBC DPA.
IRS.
Duration 36 months 18 months
Extension If KPMG fails to pay fines in timely manner, U.S. Monitorship lasts 18 months. Agreement expires on June 30,
Option Attorney's Office can extend term for up to 18 2005.
months; any other breach can result in one year
,extension. DPA not exceed five years total.
Monitor Richard C Breeden & Co, 100 Northfield St., George A. Stamboulidis, Baker Hostetler, New York, NY.
Greenwich, CT.
How selected U.S. Attorney's Office shall consult with KPMG to "Merril Lynch will also retain an individual attorney selected by
choose a mutually acceptable Monitor. If such a the Department, who shall be acceptable to Merril Lynch." 1 9.
Monitor cannot be chosen, then the U.S. Attorney's
Office has the sole right to select a monitor.
Supervised By No one. The Agreement grants broad powers to the General Counsel and Head of Corporate Audit.
Monitor. Thus, 'KPMG shall adopt all
recommendations submitted by the Monitor unless
KPMG objects ... and the (U.S. Attomeys] Office
agrees .... $ 18(a).
Duties • Review covered opinions issued 30 days prior to Merrill Lynch must retain an auditing firm to review policies
this agreement, and procedures set forth in Exhibit A (training programs,
-Review and monitor KPMG's compliance with this review committees, etc.), and an attorney (monitor) to review
agreement and Compliance & Ethics Program, and the work of the auditing firm. The auditing firm and the
make recommendations necessary to comply with attorney shall
agreement. - Ensure that the policies and procedures [in Exhibit A] are
• Review and monitor the implementation and appropriately designed to accomplish their goals; and
execution of personnel decisions regarding • Monitor Merrill Lynch's implementation of and compliance
individuals responsible for the illegal conduct, with the Policies and Procedures
Frequency of Not less often than every four months, whenever Semi-annual basis.
Reports to Monitor deems fit, and immediately upon violation
Government of any law or any provision of DPA.
Funding Authority to employ legal counsel, consultants,
investigators, experts, and any other personnel
necessary. Compensation and expenses paid by
KPMG in accordance with typical houdy rates.
Monitor receives office space, telephone service,
and clerical assistance.
Resolution of Monitor has "authority to take ... actions... No changes to policies and procedures without approval of
disagreements/m necessary to effectuate.., oversight and auditing firm and monitor.
onitor's authority monitoring responsibilities." I 18(d). Ifa KPMG
employee fails to cooperate with monitor then
monitor may, at own discretion, "recommend
dismissal or other disciplinary action." I 18(e)(V).
Replacement
Provision
Internal Changes Management Management
Required • KPMG to cease or curtail certain tax services , Creation of the Special Structured Products Committee,
including private tax practice and issuing "covered whose approval is required for any offsetting transactions.
opinions" with respect to "listed transactions".
• KPMG to maintain a permanent compliance office.
Post-Monitor KPMG agrees that its obligations to cooperate will Management
Obligations continue even after dismissal of charges, unless • As in Internal Changes Required".
prosecution is pursued and not deferred.
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Micrus Corp. and Micrus S.A. (2005) Monsanto Co. (2005)
Charges Bribing doctors in France, Spain, Germany, and Bribing an Indonesian Ministry of the Environment official and
Turkey. making false ntries into its books and records.
Agency U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section.
Fraud Section.
Fines $450,000 in fines; silent as to restitution. $1 million in fines; silent as to restitution.
Duration 36 months 36 months
Extension Monitorship for 36 months; deferral of prosecution
Option for 24 months.
Monitor Tim Dickinson, Paul Hastings, Washington, DC.
How selected Micrus must retain outside independent firm with Monsanto must retain an individual, partnership, or other entity
45 days of Effective Date, acceptable to Department.
Supervised By Corporate compliance officer.
Duties "The monitor shall: ° Certify that policies and procedures are appropriately
(a) monitor Micrus' compliance with this designed.
Agreement; - Monitor implementation of a compliance with policies and
(b) monitor Micrus' implentation of and procedures.
adherence to policies and procedures relating to ° Report findings of special review (during first year) and follow-
FCPA compliance... ; up audit (during third year) to corporate compliance officer as to
(c) ensure that Policies and Procedures are effectiveness.
appropriately designed to accomplish their goals;
... and
(e) coordinate with the SEC and provide
information about Micrs as requested by that
agency." 12.
Frequency of Semi-annual basis, and between 30 and 45 days Report findings of special review (during first year) and follow-up
Reports to before the end of 36 months, audit (in third year) to corporate compliance officer as to
Government effectiveness.
Funding
Resolution of No changes to policies and procedures without No modification of policies and procedures of Appendix B
disagreementsm approval of monitor. Knowingly, willfully failing to without approval of monitor. Monitor reports any lack of





Required * Monsanto must implement a remedial compliance program as
described in Exhibit B.
Post-Monitor Management
Obligations 1 As in "Internal Changes Required".
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New York Racing Association (2003) Prudential Securities Inc. (1994)
Charges Conspiracy to defraud the United States and aiding and Fraud in the sale of limited partnership interests.
abetting the filing of false tax returns.
Agency U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the
the Eastern District of New York. Southern District of New York.
Fines $3 million in fines; silent as to restitution. Silent as to fines. According to letter to U.S. Attorney,
$330 million paid into fund for restitution through
settlement with SEC, and agreed to pay any restitution to
any injured party, even in excess of $330 million. Claims to
have paid more than $1 billion to date.
Duration 18 months 36 months
Extension
Option
Monitor Neil V. Getnick and Judge Margaret J. Finerty, Getnick
& Getnick, New York, NY
NB: Investigative work on the monitorship by
Hawthorne Investigations & Security, Inc. Auditing work
by P. Scutero & Associates.
How selected Appointed by the court upon the recommendation of PSI must retain, within 30 days, mutually acceptable
the U.S. Attorney's Office. outside counsel.
Supervised By No one: reports directly to and is directed by an agency
to be designated by the U.S. Attorney's Office.
Duties , Monitor NYRA's compliance with the terms of the , Review PSI's policies and procedures to ensure that PSI
agreement. has adopted all the compliance-related directives in SEC
agreement.









Internal Changes Board Board
Required - Formation of a Special Oversight Committee of the , Hire a mutually acceptable new outside director to serve
Board to address any issues raised by law enforcement on the board of PSG and the Compliance Committee of
offices. PSI. Director/ombudsman/monitor is also responsible for
Management anonymous tips from employees.
, Creation of an Office of the Chairman to supervise all
business areas and departments of NYRA.
- Completion of management restructuring, including
significant replacement of staff.
- Must seek an advisory opinion from IRS.
Internal investigations
- Retained SafirRosetti, an investigation and security
firm, reporting to Special Oversight Committee, to:
Conduct a thorough review of NYRA's operations;
Recommend revisions and improvements to NYRA's
operations; and
'Maintain a fuPiime presence at NYRA to ensure
proper implementation and follow-through on such
recommended revisions and improvements. 5(g).
Post-Monitor Board Board
Obligations • As in Intemal Changes Required". I- As in 'Internal Changes Required".
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Roger Williams Medical Center (2006) Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc. (2006)
Charges Conspiracy to defraud the United States. Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977.
Agency U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Securities and Exchange Commission and U.S.
District of Rhode Island. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Freud
Section.
Fines In lieu of fines, must provide $4 million in free medical care to $7.5 million fine; silent as to restitution.
RI residents; silent as to restitution.
Duration 24 months 36 months
Extension Two years and deferral of two years. Option to extend six Schnitzer may extend the time period for retention of
Option months for first breach of agreement. Successive penalties the Compliance Consultant with prior written
of one-year extensions for further breaches may be applied, approval of the Commission staff.
not to exceed five years. If warranted by level of cooperation,
U.S. Attorney's Office may lessen duration of monitorship.
Monitor Meg Curran (assisted by Leonard Henson), McCue, Lee &
Greene, LLP, Boston, MA.
How selected Chosen and hired by RWMC with input and prior approval of Retained by Board of Directors and acceptable to the
the U.S. Attorney's Office. staff of the SEC.
Supervised By
Duties • Review and monitor RWMC's compliance with the * Review and evaluate Schnitzers internal controls,
agreement, and make such recommendations as the monitor record-keeping, and financial reporting policies and
believes are necessary to comply with agreement. procedures as they relate to Schnitzer's compliance
- Review and monitor RWMC's maintenance and execution with the books and records, internal accounting
of the revised compliance and ethics program. controls, and anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.
- At option, may conduct investigations into any reported
potentially illegal or unethical conduct, or refer to the
Executive Ethics Officer or U.S. Attorney's Office.
Frequency of No less than every four months, and whenever monitor Annually, with first report due 120 days after
Reports to deems fit. retention.
Government
Funding Compensation and expenses of monitor and persons hired "The compensation and expenses of the Compliance
under his or her authority shall be paid by RWMC at typical Consultant and of the persons hired under his or her
hourly rates, but not more than $250 per hour. authority, shall be paid by Schnitzer. 19.
RWMC may not seek reimbursement from
Medicaid/Medicare for this expense.
Monitor gets private office space, telephone service and
clerical assistance.
Resolution of "The Monitor [has] the authority to take any other actions that Schnitzer must advise SEC and monitor of any
disagreements/m are necessary to effectuate the Monitors responsibilities." recommendations in report that it disagrees with, and
onitor's authority 25. can suggest alternatives. If after 60 days of good
"All provisions in this Agreement regarding the Monitor's faith negotiation parties are unable to agree,
jurisdiction, powers, [etc] shall be broadly construed so that monitors recommendations becoming binding.
the Monitor can fully implement and review the necessary
actions and programs required under this Agreement." 22.
Replacement None; "To ensure the independence of the
Provision Compliance Consultant, Schnitzer shall not terminate
the Compliance Consultant without prior written
approval' of the SEC and DOJ. 17.
Internal Changes Management Management
Required Must revise compliance program to conform with U.S. Must adopt procedure changes set forth in
Sentencing Guidelines. monitor's report within 120 days of receiving each
Redesignate compliance officer to be Executive Ethics report.
Officer reporting directly to Board.
Post-Monitor Obligation to cooperate continues even after the DPA
Obligations terminates, as long as any individual or entity is subject to
prosecution.
Management
* As in "tnternal Changes Required".
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Statoil, ASA (2006) Symbol Technologies (2004)
Charges Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Falsification and manipulation of accounting and filing materially
Practices Act of 1977. false and misleading financial statements and other documents
with the SEC.
Agency Securities and Exchange Commission U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the
and U.S. Department of Justice. Eastern District of New York.
Fines $3 million fine paid to Norwegian $3 million in fines; $139 million in restitution in the form of stock
government; $10.5 million fine paid to and cash.
U.S. govemment; silent as to restitution.
Duration 36 months 36 months
Extension Statoil may extend the time period for
Option retention of the Compliance Consultant
with prior written approval of the
Commission staff.
Monitor
How selected Retained by Board of Directors and Retained by Symbol and acceptable to the U.S. Attorney's Office
acceptable to the staff of the SEC. and SEC.
Supervised By Reports to General Counsel with copies to U.S. Attorney's Office
and SEC.
Duties * Review and evaluate Statoil's internal Monitor Symbol's internal controls and financial reporting.
controls, record-keeping, and financial * Annually review Symbol's revenue recognition and accounting
reporting policies and procedures as they practices, intemat accounting control structure and systems,
relate to Statoil's compliances with the Symbol's implementation of, and compliance with remedial
FCPA. actions taken, and policies and procedures implemented as a
result of or relied upon this agreement.
Frequency of Annually, with first report due 120 days Annually.
Reports to after retention.
Government
Funding "The compensation and expenses of the
Compliance Consultant, and of the
persons hired under his or her authority,
shall be paid by Statoil." p. 8, $ 1.
Resolution of Statoil must advise SEC and Monitor of
disagreements/ any recommendations in report that it
monitor's disagrees with, and can suggest
authority altematives. If after 60 days of good faith
negotiation parties cannot agree,
monitor's recommendations becoming
binding [if not conflict with Norwegian
law).
Replacement None; 'To ensure the independence of
Provision the Compliance Consultant, Statoil shall
not have the authority to terminate the
Compliance Consultant without prior
written approval' of the SEC and the
DOJ. p. 12, 10.
Internal Board Board
Changes • Retained outside counsel to conduct an • Restructuring of board, including splitting of Chairman and
Required investigation. CEO functions and appointing a non-executive Chairman.
- Created a corporate compliance officer ° Revision of charter of Audit Committee to grant more
and ethics committees, responsibility and authority to the committee.
- Expanded role of Audit Committee (AC) Management
to oversee compliance with the FCPA. • Formation of a disclosure committee composed of CEO,
- New ethics policies, an ethics hotline, President, COO, CFO, SVP-Finance and Business Controller,
and new reporting lines directly to the CAP and General Counsel.
AC. Internal invesigations
Management • Symbol retained Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman in March
- Must adopt procedure changes set forth 2002 and waived attomey-client privilege with regard to the
in monitor's report within 120 days of results of this investigation.
receiving report.
Post-Monitor Board & Management
Obligations As in "Internal Changes Required".
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Titan Corporation (2005)
Charges Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
Agency Securities and Exchange Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section.
Fines $13 million in fines; $15.5 million in disgorged profits.
Duration 8 months
Extension Timeline is extremely specific: monitor must be hired within 30 days, report to the DOJ within 90 days of
Option appointment, Titan must adopt changes suggested in report within 90 days, and within 150 days of receipt of report
Titan must submit affidavit certifying that it has adopted and implemented recommendations of monitor.
Monitor
How selected Hired by Board of Directors and not unacceptable to the staff of the SEC.
Supervised By
Duties "mhe consultant shall complete [a] review and submit a report documenting findings .... The Report shall include,
without limitation, recommendations concerning policies, procedures and practices necessary to remedy (i) the
failures alleged in the complaint, and (ii) any further failures described in the report." p. 5 1.
Frequency of Within 90 days of appointment. Titan must submit affidavit of compliance within 150 days of receiving report from
Reports to monitor.
Government
Funding Titan "shall compensate the Consultant, and persons engaged to assist the Consultant, for services rendered
pursuant to this Final Judgment at their reasonable and customary rates.* p. 6.
Resolution of Titan may suggest alternative remedies to those set forth in monitor's report, and the two parties shall negotiate
disagreements/ new solutions in good faith, but 60 days after report is submitted, monitor gets final say.
monitor's
authority
Replacement None; Titan 'shall not have the authority to terminate the Consultant without prior written approval' of the SEC. p.
Provision 6.
Internal Changes Management
Required Must adopt procedure changes set forth in monitor's report within 90 days of receiving report.
Post-Monitor
Obligations
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